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LIKING TO BE IN AMERICA: PUERTO
RICO’S QUEST FOR DIFFERENCE IN THE
UNITED STATES
ÁNGEL R. OQUENDO*
I like to be in America!
O.K. by me in America!
Ev’rything free in America.
For a small fee in America!
America, WEST SIDE STORY
Lyrics by Stephen Sondheim
Music by Leonard Bernstein

I. THE PUERTO RICAN CULTURAL EXCEPTION
When Gabriel García Márquez visited Puerto Rico recently,
someone asked him why he had never written about the island. The
Colombian Nobel Prize–winning novelist smiled and paused for a
second before responding. “If I told the truth about Puerto Rico,” he
explained, “everyone would say I was making it up.”1
Indeed, the Puerto Rican experience is in many ways too
outlandish, even for magical realism. Despite being a territory of the
world’s largest exporter of democratic rhetoric, Puerto Rico does not
function as a true democracy. Puerto Ricans have absolutely no
electoral say with respect to the institutions that enact, execute, and
apply the supreme laws of the land.2 Moreover, even though it has

* Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. A.B., M.A., Ph.D.,
Harvard University; J.D., Yale University. I would like to express my appreciation to Philip
Blumberg, Christina Burnett, Maria Clara Dias, Mark Janis, Richard Kay, Wilson Mendonça,
and Shaina Spreng for their critical comments on earlier drafts.
1. Elea Carey, Spark's Novel Was Worth the Wait, COM. APPEAL, Jan. 22, 1995, at G3.
2. U.S. federal law generally applies in Puerto Rico as in any state of the Union. Yet,
Puerto Ricans enjoy no real representation in the legislative body that produces this law. They
have no Senators or Representatives in the U.S. Congress. They only send a Resident
Commissioner—who may speak but not vote (except in Committees)—to the U.S. House of
Representatives. 48 U.S.C. § 891 (1982) (establishing the position of resident commissioner as
an elected representative of Puerto Rico); New U.S. Panel to Study Future of Puerto Rico, CHI.
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lost virtually all of its economic and strategic value to the United
States, the island continues to receive increasing amounts of U.S.
federal transfer payments—up to about thirteen billion dollars a
year3—out of imperial, bureaucratic inertia. Finally, though Puerto
Ricans almost unanimously take an immense pride in their national
culture and in their distinctness from the United States, they
overwhelmingly support keeping Puerto Rico part of the United
4
States.
The first two antinomies show that U.S. foreign and economic
policy at times works in mysterious ways. This phenomenon is in
itself fascinating, but I am more interested in exploring the third
paradox, which points to what appears to be a profound tension in the
soul of the Puerto Rican people. How can Puerto Ricans, on the one
hand, celebrate their national cultural difference and, on the other
hand, want ever closer ties with the United States?
The explanation is not that Puerto Ricans irrationally pursue two
inconsistent goals—i.e., separation from and absorption into the
United States. Nor is it that Puerto Ricans see their first and
foremost aim as receiving U.S. dollars, even if they have to give up
deeply held patriotic convictions. Puerto Ricans are simply trying to

TRIB., Dec. 24, 2000, at C9 (noting that Puerto Rico has no voting representation in Congress).
Puerto Ricans do not vote for the President who has the power to sign or veto the bills that
Congress has endorsed, though (oddly enough) they do take part in U.S. presidential primaries.
Consequently, they lack ultimate electoral influence over the President that nominates or the
Senate that consents to the U.S. judges that apply federal norms in Puerto Rico.
José Trías Monge has made the following statement on this issue:
Democratic theory establishes that governments and laws must respond to the popular
will. Our difficulty stems from the fact that at this day and age, the President and the
Congress of the United States still enact laws and make decisions that affect
profoundly our lives, without our specific consent or that of our representatives. It is
true that through a plebiscite in 1950 Puerto Ricans agreed to the future application of
those North-American laws that Congress wished to extend to Puerto Rico—as long as
Congress followed certain basic norms—and blessed the continued application of those
federal laws already in force. This argument has lost any validity it might have once
had. As Carl Friedrich notes, the technique of generic consent is a precarious source
of legitimacy.
JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, SOCIEDAD, DERECHO Y JUSTICIA 22 (1986).
3. New U.S. Panel to Study Future of Puerto Rico, supra note 2, at C9 ("Washington sends
about $13 billion a year to Puerto Rico, nearly a third of its gross domestic product."). Puerto
Ricans receive these funds even though they do not pay a cent in federal income taxes. Internal
Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 933 (2004).
4. Juan Manuel Carrión poses the following question: "How can one also account for the
dichotomy within a cultural nationalism that expresses itself with great force, but that in its
political manifestations shows weakness?" JUAN MANUEL CARRIÓN, VOLUNTAD DE NACIÓN:
ENSAYOS SOBRE EL NACIONALISMO EN PUERTO RICO 105 (1996); see also id. at 232.
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find a place within the U.S. Constitution while maintaining a separate
5
national identity.
To be sure, most Puerto Ricans favor continuing or
strengthening their bonds to the U.S. federation primarily in order to
6
secure monetary support from and free access to the United States.
They have no irresistible urge to embrace U.S. traditions, symbols,
7
values, and principles. They genuinely want to be Puerto Rican, to
demarcate themselves from the rest of the U.S. citizenry, to preserve
their own ways, and to speak their own language.8
Most Puerto Ricans are nonetheless convinced that their
commitment to their cultural separateness is fully consistent with
their desire to remain part of the United States.9 They strongly
believe that the U.S. polity generally encourages diversity and
specifically permits the kind of cultural independence that they wish

5. See Mireya Navarro, Puerto Rico Rallies to Vote on Shift in Political Status, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1998, at A9 ("Puerto Ricans remain at odds over whether to cement their ties with the
United States with statehood or seek more autonomy, but most are united in holding on to
three elements of their identity—Spanish language, Latin American culture and American
citizenship.").
6. See CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 174 ("Puerto Ricans want to continue being different
from Americans while keeping the benefits of the U.S. welfare state; they want to see these
benefits increased up to a level of parity with that of the states of the Union.").
7. See Pedro A. Malavet, The Accidental Crit II: Culture and the Looking Glass of Exile,
78 DENV. U. L. REV. 753, 771-75 (2001). Malavet explains that "Puerto Rico's cultural
tropes . . . are uniquely puertorriquenas/os" and resist Americanization. Id. at 773.
8. See Ramón López, Reveladora encuesta sobre el idioma, DIÁLOGO, Jan. 1993, at 14
("The overwhelming majority of Puerto Ricans [according to a poll conducted for the Puerto
Rican Atheneum] considers itself culturally different from U.S.-Americans."); RAYMOND
CARR, PUERTO RICO: A COLONIAL EXPERIMENT 296–97 (1984) (Puerto Rican "traits and
values . . . are distinct from those of North America. . . . Moreover the [Puerto Rican] tribe has
preserved its own language."); T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY:
THE CONSTITUTION, THE STATE, AND AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP 93–94 (2002) (describing
Puerto Rico as "a polity that deeply cherishes its cultural and linguistic differences from the
mainland majority").
9. See generally Arnold Liebowitz, The Commonwealth Of Puerto Rico: Trying To Gain
Dignity And Maintain Culture, 17 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 6-7 (1982) ("Commonwealth partisans
view the Puerto Rican identity as based not only on the nation/state, but also as part of a new
federal and regional relationship, capable of retaining distinctiveness while engaging the United
States and other cultural worlds. Status as a Commonwealth or Associated State, it is argued,
would perpetuate the mutually enriching interchange of cultural traits without loss of identity.
Proponents of Statehood maintain that American federalism is sufficiently flexible not only to
allow but also to welcome the admission of a culturally distinctive Puerto Rico as a State. They
cite Hawaii particularly, not only because it is noncontiguous, but also due to its largely nonAnglo-Saxon cultural and ethnic background. Statehood advocates, such as Governor Romero
Barcelo, cite federal constitutional protections for the States in such matters as education,
marital relations, public morality, health, and welfare to show the potential for States to retain
cultural distinctiveness.")
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to maintain.10 In their view, they should be entitled, as members of
U.S. society, to the benefits of economic solidarity without having to
conform their way of life to that of their fellow citizens on the
mainland.11
The island’s two main political parties, which together regularly
account for approximately 95% of the vote in local elections, have
responded to and promoted this popular perception.12 They have
each presented their preferred political status—commonwealth or
statehood—as enabling Puerto Rico to maintain its cultural
distinctness, while belonging to the United States.13 The Popular
Democratic Party has been asserting for over fifty years that under
the current territorial status (or an improved version of such status)
Puerto Ricans can attain the goal of safeguarding their national
identity without renouncing many of the benefits of their U.S.
citizenship.14
The New Progressive Party, in turn, has been
contending since the late 1960s that an idiosyncratically Puerto Rican
15
or jíbaro statehood would enable Puerto Rico to attain full
integration into the United States without abdicating its cultural
16
uniqueness. Both parties call for a Puerto Rican government that
forcefully fosters the national culture.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See Ediberto Roman & Theron Simmons, Plenary Power And The Principle Of
Liberty: An Alternative View Of The Political Condition Of Puerto Rico, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
437, 483 (2002) ("The popular Democratic party, arguably the most popular of the territory's
three major parties, has repeatedly argued that the 1952 status change created a relationship
that empowered Puerto Rico with a true form of sovereignty, including the ability to prevent the
United States from imposing its will in all instances."); José Trías Monge, Plenary Power And
The Principle Of Liberty: An Alternative View Of The Political Condition Of Puerto Rico, 68
REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 20 (1999) (explaining that the New Progressive Party called for "a special
kind of statehood, so- called jíbaro statehood, meaning statehood which in no way disturbs local
culture, sense of identity and language use").
13. Id.
14. See CARR, supra note 8, at 297; ALEINIKOFF, supra note 8, at 75.
15. The jíbaro is the traditional peasant of Puerto Rican folklore. See supra text
accompanying note 12.
16. See CARR, supra note 8, at 297; CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 30–31. Carrión unfairly
accuses the New Progressive Party of abandoning the idea of a jíbaro state and of returning to
pre-1967 "pitiyanki"—i.e., U.S. adulatory—conceptions following the collapse of the
congressional plebiscite process, upon perceiving "that Puerto Rican culture constitutes an
obstacle for statehood." Id. at 155; see also id. at 160, 168; CARR, supra note 8, at 277
("Universalism, by which the intellectuals of the PNP meant Western values as mediated by
America, could be used if not to deny the existence of a specific Puerto Rican culture, at least to
denigrate it."); Ricardo E. Alegría, Los puertorriqueños unidos son mayoría, EL NUEVO DÍA
(Puerto Rico), Jan. 2, 1999, at 94 (observing that supporters of annexation within and without
the New Progressive Party constitute "a subculture characterized by an inferiority complex,
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Even the third party, which favors independence, proposes in
fact another variation on the theme of asserting cultural sovereignty
while maintaining strong ties to the United States. The Puerto Rican
Independence Party advocates the creation of a separate nation that
would nonetheless continue significantly within the U.S. political and
economic orbit.17 The Party calls for a transition period of ten years
or longer, within which the United States would keep the current
18
level of financial support. Even after this term ends, Puerto Rico
would presumably expect U.S. foreign aid at a level comparable to
that received by nations with special relations to the United States,
such as Israel.
A key part of this separatist economic agenda would be the
attraction of high levels of U.S. private investment through tax and
19
other incentives. Moreover, continued free movement between the
island and the mainland after independence would be crucial in order

which leads them to deny their nationality and to be willing to exchange their cultural identity
for supposed economic benefits"); Ramón Grosfoguel, Lecciones del año plebiscitario, EL
NUEVO DÍA (Puerto Rico), Jan. 2, 1999, at 71. Leadership continues to hold on to reactionary
social projects and obsolete cultural definitions in order to convince the racist North American
new right that statehood would be neither too costly nor culturally too threatening to that right
wing's interests. To deny that Puerto Rico constitutes a nation culturally and to propound neoliberal cuts as a social project is not only a colonialist position but also a dangerous process for
Puerto Rico's future no matter which status is involved. The New Progressive Party still
expresses a solid commitment to the Puerto Rican national culture. In its rules and regulations,
the Party makes the following statement: "The New Progressive Party promotes Puerto Rican
culture together with the Spanish language as the vernacular and the English language as the
second official language of Puerto Ricans." NEW PROGRESSIVE PARTY, RULES AND
REGULATIONS, STATEMENT OF PURPOSE, available at http://www.pnppr.org (last visited April
2, 2004) (copy on file with the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law). In its
platform, the Party declares: "We shall support the activities of the Institute of Puerto Rican
Culture in its effort to help hundreds of public and private entities promote cultural
engagement." NEW PROGRESSIVE PARTY, 1996 PLATFORM, CULTURAL MATTERS § 101 (on
file with author); see also id. § 114.
17. See Stephen Handleman, Puerto Rico Wants What Quebec Has, TORONTO STAR, Oct.
28, 1997, at A23 (observing that "[w]hat Puerto Rico wants is to be allowed to be itself while
remaining economically and juridically under the protection of the U.S." and quoting Manuel
Orellana, an official of the Puerto Rican Independence Party, stating that "[w]e believe that we
can be excellent partners with the U.S. in Latin America without being American.").
18. PROGRAMA DEL PARTIDO INDEPENDENTISTA PUERTORRIQUEÑO 90 (1996)
[hereinafter PROGRAMA INDEPENDENTIST 1996]. The payments would arrive not as individual
entitlements but rather as block disbursements to the sovereign government of Puerto Rico.
Id.; see also PROGRAMA DEL PARTIDO INDEPENDENTISTA PUERTORRIQUEÑO § VIII(B)
(2000) [hereinafter PROGRAMA PUERTORRIQUENO].
19. PROGRAMA INDEPENDENTISTA 1996, supra note 18; see also PROGRAMA
PUERTORRIQUENO, supra note 18.
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to avoid splitting the Puerto Rican community in two.20 Under the
Independence Party’s plan, Puerto Ricans would have the
21
opportunity to acquire double citizenship. Finally, through a series
of additional bilateral agreements, the Republic of Puerto Rico
would, to a significant extent, bind its fate with that of the United
States. 22 The two sovereign countries would thus have a common
market and currency.23
This article will not probe into this secessionist vision, but rather
into the ambitions of the advocates of a permanent relationship with
the United States—whether in the form of commonwealth or
statehood. The piece will examine specifically the extent to which
Puerto Rican cultural sovereignty is compatible with the U.S.
constitutional framework. It will, in other words, reflect upon
whether solid state support of the national culture runs counter to the
political principles that underlie the U.S. Constitution.
To this end, I will work through three conceptions of the U.S.
polity, with increasing degrees of plausibility and openness to cultural
difference.
First, the nationalist interpretation demands strict
assimilation to a common ethos by all citizens. Second, the liberal
reading tolerates diversity in the private sphere, but precludes any
official fomentation of divergent cultures. Finally, the pluralist option
contemplates the encouragement and subvention of all cultural
minorities on equal terms. I will argue that a concerted effort on the
part of the Puerto Rican government to prop up the locally
predominant culture runs counter to all three constructions. Even the
third alternative would preclude such an intense and partial cultural
engagement as a violation of the requirement of neutrality vis-à-vis
the various ethnic subgroups.
I will maintain that an associated or fully incorporated state of
Puerto Rico would be able to promote and embrace the national
culture only if exempt from the U.S. political culture—i.e., the norms

20. See WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL CITIZENSHIP 83 (1995) ("Cultures do not have
fixed centres or precise boundaries."); See also YAEL TAMIR, LIBERAL NATIONALISM 65
(1993).
21. PROGRAMA INDEPENDENTISTA 1996, supra note 18; see also PROGRAMA
PUERTORRIQUENO, supra note 18.
22. PROGRAMA INDEPENDENTISTA 1996, supra note 18; see also PROGRAMA
PUERTORRIQUENO, supra note 18.
Notwithstanding the Party's general goal of
demilitarization, a deal to allow U.S. military bases to stay on and a significantly coordinated
defense policy would be practically unavoidable.
23. PROGRAMA INDEPENDENTISTA 1996, supra note 18; see also PROGRAMA
PUERTORRIQUENO, supra note 18.
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that define constitutional democracy in the United States. To this
end, island and mainland would have to evolve towards a bilateral
association or an asymmetrical federation that would enable Puerto
Rico to exist as a distinct polity, subject to political principles
different from those in force in the fifty states. The bond between
Puerto Rico and the United States would then rest on a general set of
shared social and economic values.
Of course, this kind of arrangement would be extremely difficult
to set up as a practical matter. It would run into considerable
opposition in the United States. It would not only afford Puerto Rico
preferential treatment and establish a dangerous precedent, but it
would also specifically infringe upon the notion of a Union of equals,
particularly in the form of asymmetric federalism. Moreover, it
would be hardly justifiable on its own terms, inasmuch as it would
ultimately amount to a sheer pretense of political integration.
Appearances notwithstanding, Puerto Rico and the United States
would remain separate polities. They could construct a similar kind
of relationship more realistically and coherently as sovereign nations
through international agreements.
Nonetheless, the ultimate decision of whether to configure
United States-Puerto Rico relations domestically or internationally
bears more upon form than content. The peoples of Puerto Rico and
the United States should first focus on how they want their respective
political communities to come together in areas such as economics,
welfare, immigration, defense, and citizenship. They ought to make
sure that their coordinated interaction in these domains does not
preclude them from adhering to different political principles,
particularly on matters of national culture. Once they have solved
these substantive matters, they should find it considerably easier to
decide whether to structure their ties through a shared constitution or
an international treaty. In particular, they should be in a position to
determine whether maintaining two distinct polities within the same
constitutional space is a feasible and worthwhile endeavor.
II. TERMINOLOGICAL POINTERS
A. National Culture
I do not intend to provide an exhaustive definition of the term
“national culture.” My sole purpose in this subsection is to sketch the
concept so as to make my argument intelligible. Of course, the
discussion itself will further sharpen the contours of this key notion.
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A national culture is a set of activities and beliefs that a
24
It includes literature, music,
significant group of people shares.
cuisine, language, tradition, and perhaps even religion.25 It typically
develops over time and across generations.26 There is no fixed list of
27
Some cultural
areas that all national cultures must encompass.
ventures, such as sports, may be part of the legacy of one national
culture, but not of another.28
The individuals who converge on this multiplicity of endeavors
or commitments constitute a nation.29 They are engaged in a common
30
life project. More specifically, they share a conception of the good,
which organizes the various components of their national culture.31
Therefore, they are an ethical association, and not just an ethnic
32
group. They are bound to each other not by lineage, but rather by a

24. See, e.g., GUILLERMO BONFIL BATALLA, Identidad nacional y patrimonio cultural, IV
OBRAS ESCOGIDAS 397, 397 (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1995) ( "[d]efinitions
of ethnic groups, peoples, or nations . . . include in one way or another a reference to a common
culture as a necessary condition for the existence of those longstanding collectivities . . . ."). See
also DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 85 (1995); Oscar G. Chase, American "Exceptionalism"
and Comparative Procedure, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 277, 279 (2002) (explaining that a national
culture is "a set of values and understandings generally shared by the population that constitutes
the nation"). Clifford Geertz identifies culture with "webs of significance." CLIFFORD
GEERTZ, INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973). He explains that "culture is not a power,
something to which social events, behaviors, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed;
it is a context, something within which they can be intelligibly—that is thickly—described." Id.
at 14.
25. See GUILLERMO BONFIL BATALLA, supra note 24, at 398.
26. Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 471
(2002) (explaining that "the idea of a traditional national culture is an imagined narrative,
passed on like an inheritance from one generation to the next").
27. See TAMIR, supra note 20 at 65.
28. See generally MILLER, supra note 24, at 85; TAMIR, supra note 20, at 58.
29. See BATALLA, supra note 24, at 397 ("[D]efinitions of ethnic groups, peoples, or
nations . . . include in one way or another a reference to a common culture as a necessary
condition for the existence of those longstanding collectivities. . . ."); see also MILLER, supra
note 24, at 85.
30. Hernan Lopez-Garay, Dialogue Among Civilizations: What For?, INT'L J. ON WORLD
PEACE, Mar. 1, 2001, at 15 (arguing that a society of individuals with a common history or metanarrative have a common life project).
31. These individuals constitute a community in John Rawls' sense. In other words, they
share a comprehensive conception of the good. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 40
n.43, 42, 146 n.13, 201 (1993).
32. See, e.g., Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation, And The Politics Of
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1573, 1600 (1996) (explaining that in Doriane Lambelet
Coleman's theory of national culture "[e]thnic identification . . . disappear[ed] over time
through assimilation into a unitary national culture.")
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collective conception of how to live.33 They subsist as a community of
will, not of destiny.
Thus far, I have been mostly referring to social culture, which
evolves rather informally and often in times of leisure. Yet, many
national communities also possess a legal culture, which includes a
way of creating, applying, and categorizing the law. In addition, a
nation may have an economic culture—i.e., a particular approach to
the production and distribution of goods and services.
A political culture, which evokes an overall manner of making
decisions in politics, may be part of a national group’s heritage as
well. It may call for a presidential or parliamentary democracy, for
specific protections for minority rights, as well as for judicial review.
It may also establish how far the authorities may go in promoting the
34
national culture.
Empowering governments to take such an activist route implies
far more than simply allowing them to fund a few artistic and folkloric
projects. It also means enabling them, in principle, to promote and
identify with the nation’s peculiar approach to law, business, politics,
as well as other collective undertakings. The state’s engagement on
this front may indeed end up being intense and pervasive.
B. The United States as a Political Community
I assume that the United States constitutes a political
community. In other words, my premise is that there is a relatively
coherent set of political principles or norms that guide collective life
in the United States. Consequently, public institutions at both the
federal and the state level must comply with these principles. The
norms at issue map out a political culture, in the sense alluded to in
the previous subsection. They establish, more specifically, the general

33. See, e.g., Upendra Baxi, Universal Rights And Cultural Pluralism: Constitutionalism As
A Site Of State Formative Practices, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1183, 1193 (2000) (observing that
Kenneth Karst's vision of a "'national culture' comprises a web of a 'great many understandings
and folkways—that is, meanings and day-to-day behaviors.' These are also institutionally
embedded in language . . . ; family ('not to be confused with a common definition of family, or a
common understanding of familial duty'); religious belief (in 'some form' and with 'varying
degrees of intensity'); and a 'future-orientation'. . . .").
34. In due course, I will note that liberalism postulates unifying a profoundly diverse
society through a joint political culture. A key liberal assumption is that a multiplicity of
different national communities can accept, or perhaps even affirm, the same liberal political
principles.
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functions and the obligations of the state, as well as the basic rights
35
that individuals have against each other and against the government.
I am thus excluding not only the possibility of U.S. political
existence resting on sheer arbitrariness, but also that of viewing the
United States as an aggregation of separate and variegated political
communities. Of course, states enjoy considerable sovereignty under
36
Yet, they are not self-standing
the U.S. constitutional regime.
polities. They are part of a broader political community, which
establishes certain core principles that bind them.37
I am not supposing that the U.S. polity exists as a formal entity,
only as a philosophical idea or construction. My guiding premise is
that individuals, groups, and institutions in the United States behave
and interact in ways that suggest that they form part of a community
and that they adhere to certain fundamental principles. Political
philosophy makes explicit these tacit norms.
It does not
anthropologically interpret an opaque social ritual, but rather
develops a philosophical ideal on the basis of existing political
practices and notions.
I will present three conceptions of the U.S. political culture. I
will maintain that the third one is the most plausible. That is, it
renders in the most appealing way the precepts underlying the
Constitution, the laws, the interpretations and the political praxis in
the United States. Yet, I will not dwell on this contention. My main
concern will instead be to demonstrate that all three paradigms
preclude an intense and one-sided official defense of the Puerto
Rican national culture.
What are the consequences of infringing upon the prevailing
political principles? Certainly, there is no express enforcement
mechanism. Therefore, no institution will expressly bring charges or
hold that Puerto Rico is in violation. Instead, the U.S. reaction will
be diffuse. For instance, the federal Supreme Court might invalidate
some Puerto Rican cultural policies that impinge upon those
constitutional provisions and precedents that bear on the U.S.
35. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. arts. I–III; U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.
36. The United States Constitution constructs a federal government of limited powers, with
all remaining powers delegated to the sovereign states and the people. See, e.g., U.S. CONST.
amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.").
37. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("No state shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.").
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political culture, such as the due process or equal protection clauses
and relevant case law. Congress might, in turn, pass statutes
overriding certain local measures in support of the Puerto Rican
national culture or stonewall attempts to make Puerto Rico a
culturally distinct state. The U.S. response to a breach need not come
from one of the federal branches of government. It might instead
take the form of a condemnation by U.S. public opinion of such
Puerto Rican state action.
If the cultural agenda under consideration indeed runs counter to
U.S. political norms, Puerto Rico is presently in breach. Inasmuch as
most of federal law applies to Puerto Rico as a commonwealth, the
island already belongs and owes allegiance to the U.S. political
38
Therefore, the insular government neglects crucial
community.
duties with its efforts on behalf of the Puerto Rican national culture.
The U.S. polity may be relatively benign with respect to the
current transgressions. It may take into account not only that Puerto
Rico is not a full member of the federation, but also that Puerto
Ricans do not enjoy some of the most fundamental rights issuing from
the U.S. political community, such as the right to vote in presidential
39
and congressional elections. Nonetheless, insofar as most of the
federal law that delineates the U.S. political culture binds Puerto
Rico, the United States could hold the island accountable for failing
to comply with the underlying political principles. Of course, if
Puerto Rico were to become a state, the pressure to uphold the norms
would increase considerably.
III. NATIONAL CULTURAL CONSENSUS IN PUERTO RICO
Puerto Rico has been a U.S. territory since 1898, when the
United States wrested the island from Spain in the aftermath of the
38. See Camacho v. Autoridad de Telefonos de Puerto Rico, 868 F.2d 482, 488 (1st Cir.
1989) ("To be sure, the compact between the federal sovereign and the people of Puerto Rico
confers a measure of autonomy on the Commonwealth akin to statehood—but it has never been
read to bestow so great a degree of autonomy as to authorize the Commonwealth to escape the
burdens of federal laws, not within specifically-excepted areas . . . which Congress chooses
equally to apply to Puerto Rico when it legislates for the Nation as a whole. The critical datum
is not whether the Commonwealth approves of the law, or endorses its goals and values, or has
enacted legal or constitutional provisions antithetic to it.").
39. See Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 229 F.3d 80, 83 (1st Cir. 2000) (The
"Constitution of the United States does not confer upon United States citizens residing in
Puerto Rico a right to participate in the national election for President and Vice-President.");
United States v. Acosta-Martinez, 252 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir. 2001) (The "residents of Puerto Rico
may not vote for President, . . . and may not elect representatives to the Congress.") (citing
Iguartua De La Rosa v. United States 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir. 2000)).
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Spanish-American War.40 In 1917, the U.S. government proclaimed
41
all Puerto Ricans U.S. citizens upon birth. In 1952, Puerto Rico
adopted, with the approval of the U.S. Congress, its present
Constitution and became a “Free Associated State” or
“Commonwealth” of the United States.42
Puerto Ricans thus attained a level of self-government equivalent
to that of any state of the Union. They did not, however, acquire the
right to participate in presidential elections or to send their own
43
They simply
regular representation to the federal legislature.
preserved the prerogative of designating a Resident Commissioner,
44
who may speak but not vote in the House of Representatives.
Federal law continued to apply in Puerto Rico, unless Congress
45
decided otherwise.
Despite the constitutional settlement of 1952, the debate on the
status of Puerto Rico has not come to an end. The profound
disagreement on this issue persists to this day. Some Puerto Ricans
want the island basically to remain a commonwealth of the United
States. Others favor the full incorporation of Puerto Rico as the fiftyfirst state of the Union. A third group sees independence as the best
46
option. There are, needless to say, endless variations around these
three formulas.
Puerto Ricans opted for the commonwealth choice in the first
two plebiscites that the insular government organized in 1967 and

40. See FERNANDO PICÓ, HISTORIA GENERAL DE PUERTO RICO 223–30 (1986).
41. See Jones Act, 39 Stat. 951 (1917).
42. See Act of July 3, 1950, Pub. L. No. 81-600, ch. 446, 64 Stat. 319 (commonly known as
"Public Law 600" and empowering Puerto Ricans to adopt a constitution for their local
government); Act of July 3, 1952, ch. 567, 66 Stat. 327 (current version at 48 U.S.C. § 731d
(1982)) (approving the Puerto Rico Constitution as adopted by the Constitutional Convention
of Puerto Rico).
43. See Berman, supra note 26.
44. See 48 U.S.C. § 891 (2000) (establishing the position of resident commissioner as an
elected representative of Puerto Rico).
45. "The statutory laws of the United States not locally inapplicable . . . shall have the same
force and effect in Puerto Rico as in the United States." 48 U.S.C. § 734 (2000). See AcostaMartinez, 252 F.3d at 18 (The creation of the Commonwealth granted Puerto Rico authority
over its own local affairs; however, "Congress maintains similar powers over Puerto Rico as it
possesses over the federal states.") (quoting United States v. Quinones, 758 F.2d 40, 43 (1st Cir.
1985)); id. at 20 ("[The] default rule presumes the applicability of federal laws to Puerto Rico.").
46. See generally, Associated Press, No Decision Soon On Puerto Rico Status, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIBUNE, Dec. 30, 2002, at A13 ("Deep divisions remain over the relationship, with
some wanting to maintain the status quo [commonwealth status], others supporting the call for
statehood, and a smaller group backing full independence.").
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1993.47 However, between the first and the second vote, support for
48
this alternative dropped from 61% to 49%. The decline suggests
disenchantment with the status quo, particularly considering the fact
that during the second plebiscite an improved commonwealth was at
stake.49 In contrast, the statehood option jumped from an approval
rate of 39% to 46%.50 The independence movement boycotted the
first plebiscite and secured less than 4% of the votes in the second.51
Seeking to capitalize on momentum, a pro-statehood local
administration organized a third plebiscite in 1998.52 Puerto Rico thus
faced the choice of being (1) a U.S. territory, (2) an associated
republic, (3) a state of the Union, (4) an independent nation, and (5)
none of the above.53 This last category explicitly enabled citizens to
exercise a right, which the Puerto Rico Supreme Court had previously
54
established, to reject all the options presented in any plebiscite.

47. See Información, Plebiscito 93, Comisión Estatal de Elecciones de Puerto Rico,
http://www.ceepur.org/ (last visited April 2, 2004) (copy on file with Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law); http://eleccionespuertorico.org/ (last visited April 2, 2004)
(copy on file with Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law). See also Jose Trias
Monge, Jose Trias Monge, 83, Puerto Rico Chief Justice, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2003, at C10 ("the
commonwealth endured plebiscites in 1967 and 1993."). In the 1993 vote, the Popular
Democratic Party obtained a plurality not for the current status but rather for an improved
version. See John F. Talbot, Puerto Rico Says "Yes" to Commonwealth Status, INFO. ACCESS
CO., Dec. 18, 1993, at 4 (observing that in the 1993 plebiscite: "[T]he Puerto Rican people had
expressed a firm 'Yes' to their current position as a U.S. commonwealth, and had likewise said
'No' to becoming the 51st U.S. state . . . A key to the achievement of this 'Yes' vote was the
surprising resurgence of the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party . . . . Even though
the commonwealth vote failed to reach the coveted majority of 50 percent or more, the
referendum made it sufficiently clear that, at least for now, Puerto Ricans have opted for an
improved and 'culminated' commonwealth.").
48. See Información, Plebiscito 93, Comisión Estatal de Elecciones de Puerto Rico, at
http://www.ceepur.org/ (last visited April 2, 2004) (copy on file with Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law).
49. See id.; CARR, supra note 8, at 108 ("The Popular Democratic Party (PPD) favors the
amendment of Commonwealth by a process now called 'culmination,' which will enlarge the
autonomy Puerto Rico presently enjoys.").
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See generally Juan Cavestany, Los puertorriqueños rechazan por tercera vez la
integración plena en Estados Unidos, EL PAÍS (Madrid), Dec. 14, 1998, at 955; Julio Ghigliotty,
La quinta por mayoría absoluta, EL NUEVO DÍA (Puerto Rico), Dec. 14, 1998, at 12; see also
José Trías Monge, Plenary Power and the Principle of Liberty: An Alternative View of the
Political Condition of Puerto Rico, 68 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 1, 19 (1999).
53. See Información, Plebiscito 98, Comisión Estatal de Elecciones de Puerto Rico, at
http://www.ceepur.org/ (last visited April 2, 2004) (copy on file with Duke Journal of
Comparative and International Law).
54. Sanchez Vilella v. E.L.A., 134 P.R. Dec. 503 (1993).
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The results were clearly disappointing for the government.
Statehood was unable to muster more than the 46% support it had
55
attained in 1993. Furthermore, slightly more than 50% of the voters
embraced the “none of the above” category,56 which the procommonwealth movement had advocated in order to repudiate full
57
integration as well as the territorial definition of the current status.
The statehood option was not the only loser in the electoral
event. The independence ideal managed to perform even worse than
58
in 1993, drawing less than 3% of the electorate. Moreover, the first
two choices bombed catastrophically, each registering less than 1% of
59
the votes.
It is noteworthy that the U.S. Congress has never offered Puerto
60
Ricans a binding vote on the island’s status. The legislative bills that
would have authorized such a referendum in 1993 and 1998 died
61
On the first occasion, the responsible
without final action.
committees of each chamber never sent the projects for a plenary

55. See Información, Plebiscito 98, supra note 53.
56. See id.
57. See Mireya Navarro, With a Vote for 'None of the Above,' Puerto Ricans Endorse
Island's Status Quo, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1998, at A18 ("Popular Democratic leaders said they
were forced to protest the referendum because the Government denied them participation in
crafting the ballot definition of commonwealth and that it ended up unfairly portraying that
status as one that does not even guarantee American citizenship, which Puerto Ricans have had
since 1917.").
58. See Información, Plebiscito 98, supra note 53. See also Len DeGroot, Puerto Rico; A
Modern Island Rich in History, MORNING CALL (Allentown, PA), July 21, 2002, at S16
(showing that in the 1993 plebiscite, independence garnered 4% of the vote, while in the 1998
plebiscite it garnered 3%).
59. See Información, Plebiscito 98, supra note 53.
60. Editorial, A Choice for Puerto Rico, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1998, at A18 ("Congress has
repeatedly failed to give islanders a say on their political status."); John Hassell, Puerto Rico at
50: A Matter of Status, NEWHOUSE NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 31, 2002, at International (observing
that "[o]ne reason the issue of Puerto Rico's political status has remained open for so long is
that the U.S. Congress has refused to approve a binding vote to determine the island's future").
61. See Larry Rohter, Puerto Rico's Identity, Up for a Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at E5
("From 1989 through 1991 both the Senate and the House, urged on by the Bush
Administration, debated legislation that would have established a binding plebiscite. In the end
they failed to take action, fueling the suspicion here that Congress is simply unwilling to add a
51st star to the flag."). See generally Mireya Navarro, Puerto Rico Rallies to Vote on Shift in
Political Status, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1998, at A9 ("Congress, in turn, is sharply divided over
whether to accept Puerto Rico as a possible state, and previous bills on self-determination have
bogged down on questions about the political, cultural and economic cost of incorporating an
island with 3.8 million Latin Americans as the 51st state.").
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vote.62 The second time around, the House of Representatives
endorsed a bill on the issue, but the Senate shelved its own legislative
63
proposal at the committee level.
This lack of interest in scheduling a federal referendum is due to
the reluctance in the U.S. legislature to risk a statehood victory.
Congress’s resistance to welcoming Puerto Rico to the Union rests
principally not on racial or linguistic intolerance, but rather on a
64
political and economic basis. As a state, Puerto Rico would send, on
the basis of its population, more U.S. Representatives to Washington
than about 29 of the 50 existing states. Moreover, equal treatment to
that of the states would enable the island to secure additional U.S.
funding.65 Due to its low standard of living, Puerto Rico would
receive much more federal aid per capita than any other state in the
66
Union.
To a lesser extent, Congress’s recalcitrance also rests on the
perception that Puerto Rican cultural policies contravene the U.S.
political culture. Congresspersons have accordingly complained
about Puerto Rican statehood partisans’ insistence on officially
preserving the Spanish language and maintaining a separate
67
This kind of reservation has played a
international personality.
role—along with the stronger, political and economic concerns—in
62. See Martin Tolchin, Senate Panel Derails Bill on Puerto Rico Referendum, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 1991, at A11 ("A Senate panel today derailed, and possibly killed, a bill to authorize a
referendum that would enable Puerto Rico to choose its political future.").
63. Top of the Times: A Review of the Week's News, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1998, at A2
(observing that on March 4, 1998 "[t]he House [of Representatives] passed the Puerto Rico
statehood bill by a vote of 209-208. It would require Puerto Ricans to vote on the status of the
commonwealth by Dec. 31. The Senate has no plans to take up the bill."); Nancy E. Roman,
Lott Sees Bill For New State As Rushed; No Senate Action Set On Puerto Rico, WASH. TIMES,
Mar. 5, 1998, at A1 ("Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott vowed yesterday not to rush into a
'hornet's nest' with the Puerto Rico statehood bill that he says is unfairly tilted toward making
the Caribbean island the 51st state. 'He sees no reason to bring it up this year and has no plans
to schedule it,' his spokeswoman, Susan Irby, said yesterday.").
64. See Mireya Navarro, Puerto Rico Rallies to Vote on Shift in Political Status, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 12, 1998, at A9 ("Congress, in turn, is sharply divided over whether to accept Puerto Rico
as a possible state, and previous bills on self-determination have bogged down on questions
about the political, cultural and economic cost of incorporating an island with 3.8 million Latin
Americans as the 51st state."). But see id. (“[O]pponents of statehood have cited objections
over issues of language.").
65. Larry Luxner, Advocate Sees Independence Vote As 'Win-Win', WASH. TIMES, Mar. 31,
1996 at A8 ("Puerto Rico would . . . receive more funds from the federal government, per
capita, than any state and would contribute much less.").
66. Id.
67. See Navarro, supra note 57, at A18 ("[In] Congress . . . opponents of statehood have
cited objections over issues of language.").
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the congressional failure to organize a plebiscite on Puerto Rico’s
status.
The U.S. Congress has at times attempted to justify its inaction
68
by pointing to the lack of agreement among Puerto Ricans. This
kind of rationalization misses the mark on three grounds. First, there
actually is an overwhelming, almost unanimous, feeling in Puerto
Rico that Congress ought to authorize a binding referendum.69
Second, U.S. lawmakers could contribute to the development of a
local consensus on the island’s status by spelling out what the options
are, by presenting them to the Puerto Rican electorate, and by
committing to honor the people’s preference.70 Finally, Puerto Ricans
have reached considerable consensus on the essentials of U.S.-Puerto
Rico relations. The three main political parties posit maintaining
solid economic, civic, as well as military ties with the United States
and, more significantly, structuring Puerto Rican collective life
around the national culture.71
As already anticipated, I will probe precisely into this last point
of convergence among Puerto Rican politicians and citizens. Indeed,
most Puerto Ricans believe not only that the island should enjoy
cultural autonomy vis-à-vis the United States, but also that their
national culture is a public good, which their government should
72
It is therefore no surprise that Puerto Rican political
promote.

68. Chris Mooney, Treasure Island; Puerto Ricans Can't Vote For Congress Or The
Presidency. But They Can Write Checks. A Case Study Of What Happens When Politics Is All
Money And No Voters, AM. PROSPECT, Sept. 25, 2000, at 51 ("In the end, the internecine
struggles between Puerto Rico's factions prevent a consensus on the most basic definitions of
the island's choices. And such lack of agreement on terms is a tried and true recipe for
congressional inaction.").
69. See Editorial, Lott Should Get Out of the Way, Let Puerto Ricans Vote on Future, SUNSENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale), May 15, 1998, at A22 ("A recent poll shows 97 percent of Puerto
Ricans want a chance to vote on their political status. On the mainland, 63 percent of American
voters favor a referendum in Puerto Rico, a stunningly high figure.").
70. See id. (arguing that Congress must provide Puerto Rican's with a binding vote on the
island's status in order to allow Puerto Rican citizens to arrive at a consensus and allow them to
"resolve their most basic question in the manner of a functioning democracy").
71. Ivan Roman, As Puerto Rico Celebrates, It Still Hears Angry Voices, ORLANDO
SENTINEL TRIBUNE (Florida), July 25, 2002, at A17 (observing that the three main political
parties "continue to defend the commonwealth's ties to the United States while still allowing
Puerto Ricans to preserve their language and culture").
72. See generally Lealtades Divididas, EL NUEVO DÍA (San Juan), May 2, 2002, available at
www.endi.com (last visited April 2, 2004) (copy on file with author) ("Both mainland and island
Puerto Ricans identify strongly with their culture. For many of them, this culture is an
important part of their identity.").
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parties have virtually unanimously made the furtherance of the
national culture a central part of their platform.
The Puerto Rican Independence Party, quite predictably, has
striven to position itself as the political organization with the deepest
commitment to the national culture. It insists that only with complete
political sovereignty will it be possible to guarantee the survival and
73
flourishing of the Puerto Rican way of life. Nevertheless, the Party
has been steadily losing support since the 1950s, partly due to the
repression of its adherents by local and U.S. authorities,74 but mostly
because of the Puerto Rican economy’s increased dependence on
U.S. welfare. The success of the two other parties in presenting
themselves as guardians of the national culture has been a coup de
75
grace. The Independence Party has thus faced the difficult task of
convincing the population that, despite the apparently high financial
cost, independence is the only means to attain national and cultural
prosperity.
In contrast, the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party
has been extremely successful politically. It won every single election
from the 1940s until 1968, and has come in first or second in every
76
vote since then. The Party supports keeping the current political
77
status, though with increased sovereign powers for the island. It
maintains that free association is the only way in which Puerto Rico
can preserve its national identity while having a permanent internal
relationship with the United States.
A group of former independence advocates, the most prominent
of whom was Luis Muñoz Marín, founded the Popular Democratic
78
Party in 1938. In light of the island’s chronic underdevelopment,
these individuals partly put aside their patriotic fervor and focused on
73. See CARR, supra note 8, at 297; JOSÉ LUIS GONZÁLEZ, EL PAÍS DE CUATRO PISOS Y
OTROS ENSAYOS 40 (1981) (There is a "good cultural reason to struggle for independence.").
74. See CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 176.
75. The platform of the Puerto Rican Independence Party, not surprisingly, underscores
the tardiness and questions the authenticity of the other parties' commitment to the national
culture. PROGRAMA DEL PARTIDO INDEPENDENTISTA PUERTORRIQUEÑO 86 (1996) ("Even
those who in the past reduced culture to its folkloric expressions while promoting policies of
assimilation and incarcerating those who defended our culture and nationality today proclaim
themselves defenders of our culture and national identity.").
76. See The World of Puerto Rican Politics, at http://www.prboriken.com/prpolit.htm (last
visited Apr. 2, 2004) (copy on file with author) (observing that the Popular Democratic Party
was in political control of Puerto Rico from 1940–1968 and remains a dominant force on the
island). See also CARR, supra note 8, at 110.
77. ALEINIKOFF, supra note 8, at 87.
78. See HENRY WELLS, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO 123–27 (1969).
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growing the economy. They concluded that political ties to the
United States were essential to secure capital investment, to access
the U.S. consumer market, and to continue receiving substantial
financial aid from the U.S. federal government.79 The Party’s
forefathers also saw in the United States mainland an open space that
could help mitigate Puerto Rico’s massive unemployment and
overpopulation problem.80
The Popular Democratic Party’s founders, however, did not
altogether give up their nationalistic aspirations. They sought to
preserve Puerto Rico’s cultural identity and links to Latin America
and Spain. They accordingly conceived a political status that enabled
Puerto Rico to protect its national culture and develop its economy
under the aegis of the United States.81 Today, Party members regard
commonwealth status as a permanent framework, which offers Puerto
Ricans “the best of two worlds,”82 i.e., the cultural sovereignty
benefits of independence and the economic security of statehood.
The Party contends that the Puerto Rican national legacy would be at
risk with the full political incorporation of the island into the United
83
States.

79. See Robert P. Walzer, It's Status Quo, Statehood or Independence, NEWSDAY (New
York), Oct. 4, 1993, at 18 ("Yet the pro-commonwealth Popular Democratic Party claims in its
campaign that Puerto Rico has 'lo mejor de dos mundos'—the best of two worlds—offering U.S.
citizenship and relative financial security, along with self-government."). Muñoz Marín rejected
independence because, "as an independent republic, Puerto Rico would pay U.S. customs duties
as a foreign nation, losing privileged, duty-free access for its products to the huge stateside
market." CARR, supra note 8, at 116. "He [also] once boasted that no other man could match
him in extracting federal largess from a reluctant Congress. . . ." Id. at 113.
80. When the Party attained power, it supported the migration of millions of Puerto Ricans
to the United States. See FERNANDO PICÓ, HISTORIA GENERAL DE PUERTO RICO 263–67
(1986) (describing the massive Puerto Rican migration to the United States since the 1950's).
See generally MANUEL MALDONADO DENIS, PUERTO RICO: UNA INTERPRETACIÓN
HISTÓRICO-SOCIAL (1987) (arguing that the colonial government itself promoted and
encouraged emigration).
81. Muñoz Marín "stressed [the status'] economic and cultural advantages, especially as
compared with what Puerto Rico's situation would be under either statehood or independence."
HENRY WELLS, THE MODERNIZATION OF PUERTO RICO 328 (1969). "In spite of preserving
United States citizenship, commonwealth status also maintained Puerto Rico's cultural
autonomy, perhaps the greatest advantage of all, as Muñoz saw it." Id. at 240.
82. This was the Popular Democratic Party's slogan in the 1993 plebiscite, in which the
Party promoted an improved version of the current political status as offering "'the best of two
worlds,' the benefits of statehood and independence without the disadvantages of these two
political formulas." CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 173; see also id. at 232; ALEINIKOFF, supra note
8, at 94.
83. See CARR, supra note 8, at 297.
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The New Progressive Party, despite striving for the complete
annexation of the island by the United States, has also managed to
market itself as a defender of the national culture. Party leaders
assert that the national culture and language are not negotiable.84 In
fact, the statehood movement became a serious contender in the
political arena precisely with the foundation in 1967 of the New
Progressive Party, which expressed a deep commitment to Puerto
85
Rican values and traditions. As signaled in the introduction, the
Party propounds the transformation of Puerto Rico into not just
another member of the Union, but rather into a different kind of
constituent, that is, into a jíbaro state.86 The jíbaro is the Puerto
Rican peasant who became a national symbol in the nineteenth
century.87 The Party’s idea is that even as a state, the island would be
able to keep its own national character. Puerto Rico would be in a
position to advance a national cultural agenda and even to have a
certain degree of international recognition of its separate identity in
sports and cultural events.
Relying on this nationalistic vision and capitalizing on the
divisions within the Popular Democratic Party, the New Progressive
Party instantly went beyond merely giving credibility to the statehood
88
option and won the elections in 1968. The Party’s first President,
Luis A. Ferré, thus became governor and ended the political
89
hegemony of the Popular Democratic Party. Since 1968, the New
Progressive Party has taken turns with the Popular Democratic Party
at governing the island and has made statehood the second preferred

84. Carlos Romero Barceló, one of the founders of the New Progressive Party, as well as a
former governor, has explicitly proclaimed that Puerto Rico's language and culture are not
negotiable. See JOSÉ LUIS GONZÁLEZ, NUEVA VISITA AL CUARTO PISO 84 (1986); see also id.
at 104; CARR, supra note 8, at 297 (stating that "it is significant that modern statehooders have
had to acknowledge that Spanish will remain an official language if Puerto Rico becomes the
fifty-first state"); ALEINIKOFF, supra note 8, at 93.
85. See CARR, supra note 8, at 145 ("Although many early statehooders were ruthless
Americanizers, the PNP rejects with indignation the charge that it is indifferent to Puerto Rican
culture."). But cf. id. at 267 ("All [parties other than the New Progressive Party] make the
defense of Puerto Rican culture a center of their programs; a culture distinct from that of
mainland America.").
86. See CARR, supra note 8, at 145.
87. See MANUEL ANTONIO ALONSO, EL GÍBARO: CUADRO DE COSTUMBRES DE LA ISLA
DE PUERTO RICO 42 (l974).
88. See PICÓ, supra note 80, at 278.
89. See id. at 278.
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formula, running closely behind the status quo option, and leaving the
90
independence choice way behind.
All of the three main political parties have made a thriving
national culture a crucial goal of their political programs. As political
parties, their very existence hinges on their capacity to read the
preference of the Puerto Rican people. They have all embraced the
national cultural objective because they have correctly sensed a broad
consensus on this issue. “There is a very strong cultural nationalism,”
Juan Manuel Carrión observed, “so strong indeed that even
91
advertising companies exploit it to sell beer and cigarettes.”
Most Puerto Ricans believe that their government should foment
their national culture from within the U.S. constitutional system.
Since 1968 they have consistently elected one of the two parties that
92
favor this kind of arrangement. In fact, the New Progressive Party
and the Popular Democratic Party typically obtain a combined total
93
of about 95% of the votes. Even though it usually manages to send
two or three representatives to the legislature, the Puerto Rican
Independence Party has yet to win a single municipal election and the
Party’s candidate for governor never receives the endorsement of
more than 4% of the voters.94
I shall examine whether the prevailing political principles in the
United States allow the kind of national cultural engagement
advocated by the two principal parties in Puerto Rico. I will go
through three conceptions of the U.S. polity and their corresponding
set of political principles in order to ponder the extent to which they
authorize the island’s state institutions to promote Puerto Rican
national culture. I will present the three paradigms in order of
increased persuasiveness and tolerance for diversity.

90. See id. at 278–80.
91. CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 2; see also id. at 30.
92. See http://eleccionespuertorico.org/ (last visited April 2, 2004) (copy on file with
author).
93. See id.
94. See id.
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IV. PUERTO RICAN CULTURAL NATIONALISM
AND THE U.S. POLITICAL COMMUNITY
A. The Nationalistic Model
Under this first paradigm, the U.S. social unity rests on a thick
ethos or conception of the good.95 In other words, citizens share an
Anglo-American way of life, which structures their communal
interaction. Public institutions must advance a national culture, but
this national culture is that of the United States. Both state and
federal authorities must devote themselves to this goal.
From this perspective, the Puerto Rican government must not
only renounce its efforts on behalf of the local national culture, it
must also join its federal counterpart in promoting the U.S. national
culture. It must, for instance, make English the language of its
bureaucracy, schools and universities, as well as business and public
spaces. It must fund Anglo-American artistic projects. It must, in
general, take steps to bring its citizens to learn and embrace U.S.
traditions, customs, and ways.
Inasmuch as national culture encompasses legal practices, this
nationalistic model would also require Puerto Rico to dismantle its
civil law system and prostrate itself before the common law. The
insular Supreme Court would have to renounce its efforts to
recuperate and reinvigorate Puerto Rico’s civil law tradition as part of
the Puerto Rican national identity. It would have to overrule its
precedents calling for an interpretation of the civil code on the basis

95. Isaiah Berlin thus describes this kind of nationalism: "Common ancestry, common
language, customs, traditions, memories, continuous occupancy of the same territory for a long
period of time, were held to constitute a society. This kind of homogeneity emphasized the
differences between one group and its neighbours, the existence of tribal, cultural or national
solidarity, and with it, a sense of difference from, often accompanied by active dislike or
contempt for, groups with different customs and different real or mythical origins; and so was
accepted as both accounting for and justifying national statehood." Isaiah Berlin, Nationalism:
Past Neglect and Present Power, in AGAINST THE CURRENT 333, 338 (H. Hardy ed., 1981). See
also CHARLES TAYLOR, RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES 41 (1993) ("The ancient tradition of
civic humanism stressed that self-government was only possible for a community where the
members identified strongly with their public institutions, to use modern language, or where
men loved the laws, to use the old terminology."); MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE
AN AMERICAN 53 (1992) ("Most political theorists, from the time of the Greeks onward, have
assumed the national or ethnic homogeneity of the communities about which they wrote. Prior
to the work of Rousseau, theory was never explicitly nationalist, but the assumption of a
common language, history, or religion underlay most of what was said about political practices
and institutions.").
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of civil law sources and at the expense of common law norms.96 It
would have to require that local courts not only read the existing legal
codes as a collection of common law statutes, but also incorporate
U.S. doctrine and case law into their analysis.
Within the nationalistic conception, Puerto Rico would also have
to assimilate the U.S. economic and political culture. Doing so would
cause no major trauma, since the island already follows,
preponderantly, U.S. economic and political practices. First, the most
prominent corporations operating on the island report back to
headquarters in the United States.97 In addition, other companies
follow with equal vehemence U.S. business models.98 Second, the
Puerto Rican Constitution embraces U.S. forms of government. Like
most states of the Union, Puerto Rico has a strong executive governor
who is independent from the legislature, a Senate in which districts
have equal representation, a House of Representatives with
population-based mandates, and a Supreme Court with final
jurisdiction over all cases decided by Puerto Rican tribunals.99
Nevertheless, the local administration would have to keep in check
autochthonous variations in the realm of economics and politics.
Under a nationalist construction, the U.S. political culture would
formally converge with its Puerto Rican counterpart in accepting the
legitimacy of state promotion of the national culture. Yet, it would
invest that policy with a substantially different content. As already
noted, it would identify the nation with the Anglo constituency and
would require the Puerto Ricano government to follow course.
If the Puerto Rican government failed to fulfill its obligations
toward the U.S. national culture, the nationalistic community in the
United States would intervene. This intervention would take the
form of political pressure from the U.S. executive and legislative
branches, sanctions from the federal courts, as well as heavy criticism
within the U.S. public sphere. The United States would thus

96. See Valle v. Am. Int'l Ins., 108 D.P.R. 692, 738 (1979) (reversing all previous cases that
had "solve[d] civil-law problems through common-law principles").
97. The Puerto Rican "government has successfully attracted and retained many hightechnology capital-intensive manufacturers, including pharmaceuticals, computer, electronic,
and scientific- and medical-instrument manufacturers. . . . Fifty-seven of the Fortune 100 and 162
of the Fortune 500 companies operate in Puerto Rico." ERNST & YOUNG, L.L.P., DOING
BUSINESS IN PUERTO RICO 5 (2000).
98. In fact, Puerto Rico corporate law is modeled on U.S. business law. See Puerto Rico's
General Corporations Law, 14 L.P.R.A. §§ 2601–3455 (Supp. 1997).
99. See arts. III–IV, Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (1952).
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communicate to the Puerto Rican government the incompatibility of
its policy with fundamental U.S. political principles.
Many opponents of statehood for Puerto Rico presuppose some
version of this nationalistic conception of the United States. The
extreme right in the United States and the radical left in Puerto Rico
converge on this point. The former group feels that the Union should
not admit a nationally divergent subgroup, such as that existing in
100
The latter contingent fears that the United States
Puerto Rico.
would compel the prospective State of Puerto Rico to renounce its
101
Both camps view the United States as an
national differences.
essentially homogeneous society that can tolerate no diversity.
However, this model hopelessly distorts U.S. reality. The
Federal Constitution actually empowers the people to engage in their
own pursuits of happiness, so long as they respect the basic norms of
102
The
cooperation embodied in the fundamental laws of the land.
post-Civil War constitutional reforms underscored that all groups had
a right to their own self-realization, yet augmented the scope of the
common purpose. This latter expansion continued throughout the
twentieth century with the legislative and adjudicative construction of
the welfare and solidarity state. Nonetheless, the U.S. Constitution
has consistently secured broad spaces of freedom for particular
communities to live their own ideas of the good life. The liberties

100. See, e.g., Patrick J. Buchanan, Statehood Involves 'Self-Determination' Not Only for
Puerto Rico But Also for U.S., AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 21, 1998, at A5 (noting that supporters
of Puerto Rican statehood would "have the United States swallow a nation with a separate
culture, language and identity from our own, and to try to assimilate a people who will fight
assimilation. . . . But just as Puerto Rico has a God-given right to remain Puerto Rico, America
has a God-given right to remain America.").
101. See Rubén Berríos Martínez, Definición y convergencia, SITIO: PARTIDO
INDEPENDENTISTA PUERTORRIQUEÑO, at http://www.pip.org.pr/artdef.htm (last visited Apr. 2,
2004) (copy on file with author) (quoting Puerto Rico Nationalist Party founder Pedro Albizu
Campos, "[i]t is impossible to transform this Spanish American nation into an Anglo-Saxon
community. Statehood would therefore be an absurd option inasmuch as it would require the
United States to destroy its national unity."); see also CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 181 (stating
that it is "utopian" to expect real respect for "national identities and ethnic differences"); id. at
207 (pointing to Louisiana and New Mexico as examples of states that lost much of their
distinctive cultures after having become part of the United States).
102. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (noting that the liberty guaranteed by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution "denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy
those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men").
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that originally covered only religious denominations have come to
encompass all kinds of associations, including ethnic groups.
Beyond these historical and juridical arguments, philosophical
considerations of weight militate against the nationalistic paradigm.
In general, a diverse society acts unfairly when it foists the majority’s
conception of the good on everybody else. It thus oppresses
minorities and dissidents.
If there is a justification for this kind of subjugation, it must
involve extremely compelling reasons. The authorities may not
impregnate official structures with the majority’s culture out of whim
or narcissism, let alone hegemonic ambition. They must instead show
that the common culture faces a serious risk that calls for a collective
response, that they have not adopted overbroad measures, and that
they have preserved sufficient space for the cultural self103
determination of underprivileged and dissenting subgroups.
The federal government of the United States could not make the
claim that the majority Anglo culture is endangered with the least
credibility. It may therefore not endorse, embrace, or saddle that
culture on its citizens. It may only rely on reasons of expediency or
convenience to support the continued use of the English language and
the common law approach in U.S. political and legal institutions.
Though justified, this bias towards the majority culture imposes
compensatory obligations on the polity.
For instance, the
104
It should
government should adopt a tolerant language policy.
refrain from declaring English the official language or categorically
precluding its employees from using foreign languages. Moreover, it
should encourage bilingual programs in school and at work. It should
generally treat divergent national cultures with tolerance and
openness.
In sum, Puerto Ricans need not embrace anything like a
mainstream U.S. Weltanschauung to join the Union. Neither the local
nor the federal government has the authority, let alone the obligation,
to coerce Puerto Ricans to give up their differences. On the contrary,
the state has a duty to enable Puerto Ricans, as well as other national
groups, to follow their own life plans.

103. Of course, nationalistic communities typically make no excuses and offer no
explanations. They promote a particular way of life simply because it is that of their members,
or at least of a majority thereof. See Berlin, supra note 95.
104. José Luis González expressed grounded skepticism about the willingness of the United
States to show this kind of flexibility on language matters. GONZÁLEZ, supra note 84, at 104.
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In rejecting the nationalistic conception, I have appealed to the
notion that the United States does not propagate a national ethos.
The implication is that individuals and collectivities in the United
States may basically go their own ways, but not necessarily that they
may invoke the assistance of their government to this end. I will now
specifically determine whether any official engagement on behalf of
national culture is legitimate. To do so, I will work through first a
liberal and thereafter a pluralist portrayal of the U.S. political
community.
B. The Liberal Alternative
Under a nationalistic interpretation, U.S. communal principles
would not allow Puerto Rican public institutions to foment the local
conception of the good. This subsection will move on to a liberal
construction, drawing on the views of John Rawls and Jürgen
Habermas. The question will be not only whether the ensuing norms
are valid, but also whether they would condone the official promotion
of the Puerto Rican national culture.
After providing a philosophical justification for the principles of
political liberalism, Rawls develops the notion of an “overlapping
consensus.”105 Through this concept, he explains the stability of—and
provides additional reasoned support for—a society organized around
the previously defended norms. The principles of political liberalism
specify a basic set of liberties, such as the right to vote, to express
opinions, to exercise religion, or to a fair wealth distribution. These
norms rest on a thin conception of the good and are therefore
compatible with multiple conceptions of the good life. Individuals
and groups who do not share a full-fledged religious or philosophical
interpretation can nonetheless pledge allegiance to the same
politically liberal institutions. 106
Of course, the complete justification that each person or
community has for upholding these institutions will vary depending
on the underlying comprehensive doctrine. Yet, the different
rationales will converge on the same principles. The stability of a
society built along these lines stems from the fact that people
adhering to different religions and philosophies will tend to be loyal,
inasmuch as the main institutions rest on broadly shared norms. Only
105. See generally RAWLS, supra note 31, at 133–72.
106. See id. at 135 ("[P]olitical liberalism supposes that there are many reasonable
comprehensive doctrines with their conception of the good, each compatible with the full
rationality of human persons.").
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individuals that embrace unreasonable religious or philosophical
perspectives, which deny the fundamental norms of political
liberalism, will not join the principled convergence.
In elaborating his theory, Rawls is thinking of the problem of
divergence in philosophical and religious doctrines. Yet, one can
bring the concept of an overlapping consensus to bear on the issue of
107
One would thus
ethnic heterogeneity within a single society.
probably end up in the vicinity of Habermas’s notion of constitutional
patriotism.108
Habermas contends that national diversity, which ineluctably
characterizes modernity, need not give rise to insoluble crises or to
anomie. For the modern state may integrate its citizens not on the
basis of common national language, ethnicity, or culture, but rather
through a shared political culture.109 In other words, the state acts
exclusively on the basis of a general set of norms—democratic
principles, the rule of law, and human rights—to which a very
heterogeneous citizenry can assent. Beyond this political culture, the
state agenda takes no particular content—religious or national.
Citizens come together through and identify with a constitution
embodying that political culture.110 “A liberal political culture,”
107. Rawls insinuated that even though he focused primarily on the issue of religious
toleration, his political liberalism bears on other basic problems such as "race, ethnicity, and
gender." Id. at xxx–xxxi (1993); see also id. at 154.
108. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT UND GELTUNG: BEITRÄGE ZUR
DISKURSTHEORIE DES RECHTS UND DES DEMOKRATISCHEN RECHTSSTAATS [BETWEEN
FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY]
651 (1992) [hereinafter, HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT]; JÜRGEN HABERMAS, DIE EINBEZIEHUNG
DES ANDEREN: STUDIEN ZUR POLITISCHEN THEORIE 143, 263–64 (1996) [hereinafter
HABERMAS, DIE EINBEZIEHUNG]. Dieter Henrich attributed the term "constitutional
patriotism" to Dolf Sternberger. DIETER HENRICH, NACH DEM ENDE DER TEILUNG: ÜBER
IDENTITÄTEN UND INTELLEKTUALITÄT IN DEUTSCHLAND 74 (1993).
109. Habermas advocated identifying the nation state with the "political culture in which the
constitutional principles can take root" and which does not need the support of "an ethnic,
linguistic, and cultural origin common to all state citizens." HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT, supra
note 108, at 642.
110. In Habermas's own words: "The state citizens' nation finds its identity not in ethnic or
cultural commonalties but rather in the praxis of citizens, who exercise actively their democratic
participatory and communicative rights. Here the republican component of state citizenship
detaches itself completely from the membership in a pre-political community integrated through
lineage, a shared tradition, and a common language." HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT, supra note
108, at 636; see also id. at 643 ("Democratic citizenship need not be rooted in the national
identity of a people. Yet, it demands the socialization of all citizens in a common political
culture, independently of the diversity of the various cultural life forms."); id. at 659 ("Within
the constitution of a democratic legal state, a variety of life forms may coexist with equal rights.
They must, to be sure, overlap in a common political culture, which remains open to
participation by different life forms.").
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Habermas affirmed, “is simply the common denominator of a
constitutional patriotism, which as such intensifies the appreciation of
the diversity and the integrity of the various coexisting life forms in a
multicultural society.”111
Rawls discusses political liberalism with the U.S. experience in
mind. Habermas explicitly mentions the United States as an instance
of the post-national state he describes.112 From these perspectives,
U.S. society does not impose a comprehensive national perspective,
but rather proposes a Rawlsian overlapping consensus or a
Habermasian constitutional patriotism.113
U.S. laws and the
Constitution bind federal authorities to a set of norms generally
corresponding to the political liberal principles and the political
culture referred to by Rawls and Habermas, respectively.
This U.S. liberal society is not merely an open arena in which
members organize their collective affairs. It also possesses a strong
normative content, with which citizens identify, which they perceive
as reasonable, and which requires impartiality on the part of public
institutions. This mandate precludes the official endorsement of a
particular national culture. Yet, a liberal government creates space
for citizens to further their own national culture. It not only permits
private cultural manifestations, but it also protects them against
aggression by any person or entity.
The U.S. Constitution certainly appears to endorse this kind of
liberalism. On the one hand, it contains general provisions on
114
It thus grants individuals
democracy and broad individual rights.
and groups wide cultural autonomy. On the other hand, it contains
111. HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT, supra note 108, at 642–43.
112. Habermas maintained that "the example of multicultural societies such as Switzerland
or the United States shows that a political culture, from which fundamental constitutional
principles may stem, need not in any way rest on an ethnic, linguistic and cultural origin
common to all state citizens. A liberal political culture is simply the common denominator of a
constitutional patriotism, which as such intensifies the appreciation of the diversity and the
integrity of the various coexisting life forms in a multicultural society." HABERMAS,
FAKTIZITÄT, supra note 108, at 642–43; see also HABERMAS, DIE EINBEZIEHUNG, supra note
108, at 137.
113. Interestingly enough, an early supporter of Puerto Rican statehood, José Celso
Barbosa, advocated an "intelligent patriotism," which in some ways appears to parallel the
notion of constitutional patriotism. He wrote: "Fatherland is not just the land where one is
born. Our liberties and rights are fatherland too." José Celso Barbosa, Conversación familiar,
in ANTOLOGÍA DEL PENSAMIENTO PUERTORRIQUEÑO: 1890–1970 (Eugenio Fernández
Méndez ed., 1975). However, Barbosa pleaded for the Americanization of Puerto Ricans and
the imposition of the English language in Puerto Rico. Id. See generally CARRIÓN, supra note
4, at 212–13.
114. U.S. CONST. arts. I, II, & IV and amends. I–X, XIV, XIX, & XXVI.
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an Equal Protection Clause, which forbids official discrimination.115
The government must therefore act without bias and, presumably,
refrain from siding with any one of its national subgroups.
All states of the Union share and express in their own
constitutions a similar conception of the government’s proper role.
Furthermore, the Constitution itself imposes the same political
culture on the states. It establishes—at least under the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause—that the states must honor most of the Bill of Rights
116
contained in its first ten Amendments. For example, the rights to
freedom of expression and of conscience, against unwarranted
searches and seizures, and to privacy apply to the states as well as to
the federal government.117 Moreover, the Equal Protection Clause
literally binds the states. Therefore, the earlier argument against
official bias in favor of a particular national culture would appear to
bear first and foremost on the states. It would also affect Puerto Rico
as a state or a commonwealth.
Accordingly, the U.S. federal government has no business
coercing individuals in Puerto Rico into giving up their national
culture or embracing a U.S. alternative. On the contrary, it has a duty
to guarantee their right to preserve their national distinctness. By the
same token, the government of Puerto Rico has no obligation to
115. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
116. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969) (fifth Amendment bar against
double jeopardy); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (sixth Amendment right to a
criminal trial by jury); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967) (sixth Amendment right of a
defendant to present witnesses); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 226 (1967) (sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment);
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); NAACP v.
Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (first Amendment freedom of association); In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 278 (1948) (sixth Amendment right to a public trial); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947) (first Amendment ban on the establishment of religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296 (1940) (first Amendment free exercise of religion); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652
(1925) (first Amendment freedom of speech and press). The Supreme Court has chosen not to
extend some parts of the Bill of Rights to the states. But c.f. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S.
516, 538 (1884) (fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury does not apply to the
states). See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Hugo Black and the Hall of Fame, 53 ALA. L. REV.
1221, 1230 (2002) ("Today, virtually all of the Bill of Rights has come to apply with equal vigor
against state and local governments. The only major exceptions are the Second Amendment,
the Third Amendment (which rarely arises in modern adjudication), the Fifth Amendment
grand jury requirement, and the Seventh Amendment's rules regarding civil juries.").
117. Id.
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inculcate anything like a U.S. national ethos, let alone to eradicate the
Puerto Rican national culture.
Liberals would maintain just as steadfastly that the government
of Puerto Rico may not promote a purportedly authentic Puerto
Rican way of life. They would vehemently censure such a policy as
discriminatory. From this point of view, individuals that do not share
the subsidized culture, such as Anglo-Americans, would be entitled to
remonstrate. People that reject the official interpretation or any kind
of support for national culture would also have a right to complain,
for the cultural measures in question would infringe upon U.S.
political culture. Such measures would violate basic liberty and
equality principles.
According to these liberal norms, public
institutions should not foment the national culture of one subgroup at
the expense of all.
Puerto Rican authorities might respond by pointing out that well
118
Yet,
over 90% of the population supports their cultural policies.
liberals would not be impressed. They would note that U.S. political
culture aims, first and foremost, at protecting individuals. “Each
person,” affirmed John Rawls, “possesses an inviolability founded on
justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override.”119
No matter how many Puerto Ricans endorsed the official cultural
agenda, liberalism would disallow it as a violation of the prerogatives
of minorities and dissidents.120
Making the monetary contributions to the government’s cultural
effort voluntary not only would create a risk of too many defections,
but would also have little effect on the liberal critique. According to
liberalism, cultural outsiders and dissenters could legitimately reject
the official endorsement of the majority culture even if they received
generous exemptions. They could object to their government’s
promotion of a cultural perspective that is alien to them. They could
complain about the symbolism and about the discrimination,
irrespective of who is footing the bill.

118. State officials might observe that Puerto Ricans support only political parties that
actively promote the national culture.
119. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 3 (1971).
120. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 194 (1977) (arguing that "[a]
right against the Government must be a right to do something even when the majority thinks it
would be wrong to do it, and even when the majority would be worse off for having it done");
see also id. at 269 (arguing that "if someone has a right to something, then it is wrong for the
government to deny it to him even though it would be in the general interest to do so").
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To recapitulate, Puerto Ricans need not commit national cultural
suicide to be part of the United States. They may remain faithful to
their nationality, as individuals and even as a group. What they may
not do within a liberal framework is recruit their political institutions
in this effort. In doing so, they would impinge upon the U.S. liberal
political culture. From this perspective, the Puerto Rican desire to
have a local government that solidly foments the national culture is
incompatible with the legitimate wish of Puerto Ricans to remain
within the U.S. federation.
C. Towards Pluralism
Liberalism’s ban on the cultural policy in question does not end
the discussion, since one may reject the liberal standpoint. In fact, the
rejection may appeal precisely to liberalism’s insufficient openness to
cultural differences. Thus, one may have independent theoretical
reasons to move to a model that may be more amenable to the Puerto
Rican government’s efforts on behalf of the national culture.
The objection I have in mind focuses on liberalism’s apparent
indifference to various national cultures.121 It censures the liberal
message that national subgroups may devote themselves (on their
own) to their culture, but they should not expect any government
support. It insists that the political community should instead
expressly appreciate and promote the different ethical cultures and
pluralism in general. It maintains that a post-national U.S. society
should transform or perhaps even transcend its liberal premises. It
thus posits a pluralist conception of political community.
Embracing this kind of pluralism, Michael Walzer insists on the
legitimacy of active official encouragement of national groups. He
suggests that government, particularly in the United States, may
embrace pluralism and focus on promoting diversity. The authorities
may, accordingly, subsidize ethnic or national minorities. They need
not be indifferent to national cultural issues or adopt a policy of non122
intervention.
121. Rawls rejected the allegation that political liberalism is indifferent to the value of
comprehensive doctrines. RAWLS, supra note 31, at 150, 172. If it were, it would be in
opposition to them and therefore not capable of achieving an overlapping consensus. Id. at 150.
Political liberalism therefore neither asserts nor denies the truth or the value of any particular
doctrine. Id. It could therefore view them generally as valuable and therefore move towards
the pluralism that I explicate in this section. For an interpretation of liberalism that
affirmatively values national groups, see TAMIR, supra note 20, at 3.
122. MICHAEL WALZER, ON TOLERATION 37 (1997); see also id. at 34 (suggesting subsidies
and matching grants as examples of positive state support of multiculturalism).
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Walzer maintains that the threat to social unity in contemporary
immigrant societies, such as the United States, is not that subgroups,
including those based on nationality, are too prominent and pull the
community apart.123 He contends, on the contrary, that the weakness
124
of these associations hinders broad societal cohesion. His reasoning
unfolds as follows. In the United States, the only unifying force is a
common political culture. Citizens typically participate in the
institutions that embody the shared principles of democracy, legality,
and human rights not as individuals, but as members of particular
subgroups, which may rest on union, gender, religious, or national
affiliation. In other words, participation in the broader collective
spectrum usually takes place through these civic associations, which
act as representatives of their constituency.
Moreover, these
subgroups serve as a training ground for political engagement
inasmuch as their members become inter-subjectively active within
their ranks. Social solidarity has been breaking down because these
associations and the citizens’ links to them have been disintegrating.
Walzer, hence, believes that the government must help
125
In thus renouncing its
reinvigorate these associative subgroups.
indifference to the collectivities organized around specific concepts of
the good life, the state would enhance the vibrancy of political life. I
would add two general points to Walzer’s account. First, promoting
national subgroups contributes not only to civic engagement, but also
to individual and collective well being, as well as to social stability.
Secondly, the argument for such a pluralist societal agenda may be
reflexive or deontological in addition to instrumental or teleological.
In other words, society should buttress its ethical minorities in order
to respect their rights, as well as to attain its own particular ends.
These communities are entitled to recognition in the sense
popularized by Charles Taylor. Taylor elucidates the concept as
follows:

123. See id. at 101–12 (suggesting alternative causes of social dissociation, such as rising
divorce rates, growing teen pregnancy, and increasing geographic mobility). Julia Kristeva, in
contrast, pointed out that the accentuation of sexual, national, and religious identities
undermines personal freedom and increases divisiveness. JULIA KRISTEVA, NATIONS
WITHOUT NATIONALISM 2–3 (1993).
124. See WALZER, supra note 122, at 101–12 ("It is the weakness of [cultural] associations,
not their strength, it seems to me, that threatens our common life.”).
125. See Michael Walzer, Pluralism and Social Democracy, 45 DISSENT 47, 53 (1998) ("The
singular, universal political community requires a particularistic associational life; the
associations require the political framework of state power.").
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The recognition I am talking about here is the acceptance of
ourselves by others in our identity. We may be “recognized” in
other senses—for example, as equal citizens, or right bearers, or as
being entitled to this or that service—and still be unrecognized in
our identity. In other words, what is important to us in defining
who we are may be quite unacknowledged, may even be
condemned in the public life or our society, even though all our
126
citizens rights are firmly guaranteed.

By recognizing its subgroups, therefore, the polity gives them their
due and treats them with respect, beyond strategic or even altruistic
calculations.
These reflections lead to a rejection or, rather, to a modification
of the liberal principles that I expounded on before. Society should
not simply condone its national subgroups. It should promote them
because doing so is generally beneficial, as well as morally correct.
127
Pluralism constitutes not just a fact, but actually a good and a right.
In fact, Habermas seemed to take a pluralist position when he
advocates a constitutional patriotism that “intensifies the
appreciation of the diversity and the integrity of the various
coexisting life forms in a multicultural society.”128
Of course, it is ultimately up to individuals themselves to decide
whether they want to bond with or distance themselves from a given
community.
The government may not coerce people into
participating in any of these collectivities. It may, at best, provide
resources and create favorable background conditions. The groups
themselves must fire up their membership’s imagination. Only then
will they be in a position to reproduce their way of life and bring their
particular perspective to society-wide political deliberation.
Accordingly, Habermas cautions that it is pointless for the state to try
to guarantee the survival of cultural communities as if they were
endangered species.129 If the peoples concerned are not themselves
126. CHARLES TAYLOR, RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES 190 (1993). A people's demand
"for recognition in the sense that I am using the term," Taylor wrote, is "a demand that such
people be acknowledged and valued for what they are." Id. at 92. See generally id. at 48, 52, 58,
142–43, 162, 169, 188, 190–96.
127. Rawls explained that "political liberalism assumes the fact of reasonable pluralism as a
pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, including both religious and nonreligious doctrines."
RAWLS, supra note 31, at XXVI; see also id. at 24, 27, 36, 135, 144 (asserting that a "permanent
feature of the public culture of democracy" is toleration of diverse social positions, be they
religious, political, or philosophical).
128. HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT, supra note 108, at 642–43.
129. See Jürgen Habermas, Multiculturalism and the Liberal State, 47 STAN. L. REV. 849, 850
(1995) ("There cannot be a 'preservation' of cultures in the same sense as most of us advocate
the preservation of animals or other species. The reproduction of traditions and cultural forms
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willing to fight for their own continued existence, any official effort
will be hopeless.
Both Walzer and Habermas believe that the authorities must
remain impartial or neutral when engaging in cultural politics.
Though the government need not be “perfectly indifferent to group
culture,” Walzer insists that it must be “equally supportive of all
130
groups.” “The ethical content of a political integration that unifies
all citizens,” Habermas maintains, “must remain ‘neutral’ with respect
to the different ethnic and cultural communities, which coalesce
internally through their own conception of the good.”131 Walzer and
Habermas do not mean, of course, to take back what they assert
about the state’s cultural engagement. Nor do they intend to
maintain that the government must provide absolutely equal support
to the various groups. Their idea is instead that the official assistance
to national subgroups must be equal in relative terms. Thus, a
traditionally disadvantaged community may receive more aid than a
historically privileged one.
Pluralism, accordingly, regards neutrality as a crucial and
complex concept. It demands, as just pointed out, government
impartiality with respect to cultural communities and their
conceptions of the good. However, it rejects a neutral attitude about
the value of this multiplicity of viewpoints and of diversity in general.
It constructs a substantive conception of the good, which neither
converges with nor excludes the interpretations of the legitimate
ethnic collectivities, around this value. It thus distances itself
critically from liberalism.

is an achievement which can be legally enabled, but by no means granted. Reproduction here
requires the conscious appropriation and application of traditions by those native members who
have become convinced of these traditions' intrinsic value. The members must first come to see
that the inherited traditions are worth the existential effort of continuation."); see also
HABERMAS, DIE EINBEZIEHUNG, supra note 108, at 259. Walzer would endorse this
Habermasian contention. He declared: "Pluralism has in itself no powers of survival; it depends
upon energy, enthusiasm, commitment within the component groups; it cannot outlast the
particularity of cultures and creeds." MICHAEL WALZER, WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN
AMERICAN 65 (1991). Walzer asserted further that "early pluralists . . . were surely right to
insist that [ethnic vitality] should not artificially be kept alive, any more than it should be
repressed by state power." Id. at 74; see also id. at 76-77 ("A state committed to pluralism . . .
cannot do anything more than see to it that those opportunities [for group organization and
cultural expression] are available, not that they are used.. . .").
130. WALZER, supra note 122, at 37; see also id. at 34 ("Given the logic of multiculturalism,
state support must be provided, if it is provided at all, on equal terms to every social group.").
131. HABERMAS, DIE EINBEZIEHUNG, supra note 108, at 266.
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The U.S. Constitution incarnates this pluralist vision. It certainly
allows the government to protect subgroups in order to enhance
132
citizens’ well-being, political participation, and collective peace.
More significantly, the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth
Amendments embody a powerful mandate to recognize AfricanAmericans and all other ethnic communities.133 The Supreme Court
has explicitly upheld official privileges for certain groups in order to
make up for past discrimination and has acknowledged the promotion
of diversity as a legitimate governmental goal.134
The United States, conceived as a pluralist state along these
lines, may engage in and allow official support for Puerto Rican
culture. Under this logic, federal and local governments may invest in
and promote Puerto Rican national culture to a greater extent than
they do in the case of other national groups. To be sure, they would
have to show that the culture has historically suffered substantial
discrimination or that it is in a position of systematic disadvantage vis135
à-vis other cultural manifestations.
Nonetheless, the insular state may not act as the executive
committee of national culture. It would thus encroach upon the
pluralist notion of neutrality. It would show too much partiality
132. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) ("[I]n enacting Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress intended to prohibit all practices in whatever form
which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of race,
religion, sex, or national origin [and] 'to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of
unlawful employment discrimination.'") (quoting Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,
418 (1975)); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 337 (1966) ("[T]he Voting Rights Act
[constitutes] a valid means for carrying out the commands of the Fifteenth Amendment.
Hopefully, millions of non-white Americans will now be able to participate for the first time on
an equal basis in the government under which they live."); Allentown Mack Sales & Serv. v.
NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 396 (1998) ("The primary objective of the National Labor Relations Act is
to secure labor peace.").
133. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII–XV.
134. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 & 314 (1978) (holding that
where there is a "judicial, legislative, or administrative finding of constitutional or statutory
violations" against "members of . . . victimized groups . . . the governmental interest in
preferring members of the injured groups at the expense of others is substantial." The Court
further held that "the interest of diversity is [a] compelling [state interest] in the context of a
university's admissions program."). See also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Federico Peña, Sec'y
of Transp., 515 U.S. 200, 236 (1995) (stating that "[t]he unhappy persistence of both the practice
and the lingering effects of racial discrimination against minority groups in this country is an
unfortunate reality, and the government is not disqualified from acting in response to it" so long
as the legislation in question is narrowly tailored to further this compelling interest).
135. Grutter v. Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2325, 2337–38 (2003). The Court underscored that it
had "never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is
remedying past discrimination" and held "that the Law School has a compelling interest in
attaining a diverse student body." Id. at 2338.
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towards one of its national groups and would have excessive control
over national culture. If the federal government supported or
consented to this kind of policy, it would make itself an accomplice in
violation of U.S. political principles.
Naturally, every state of the Union devotes some of its resources
to promoting the history and traditions of its residents. Yet, the
Puerto Rican policy at issue transcends this general practice
quantitatively and, especially, qualitatively. It involves not just
nominal subsidies to homegrown folklore and art, but rather a
concerted attempt to uplift a particular national culture.136 It has no
precedent in the United States. Pluralism empowers the insular
government to subsidize Puerto Rican national culture to make up for
past discrimination, but not to see itself as the representative of that
culture in any special sense. It must embody on rigidly equal terms
the goals shared by all persons residing in Puerto Rico. It has to be
the collective voice and arm of natives of the United States and all
other U.S. citizens that happen to live on the island, as well as Puerto
Ricans. It has as much leeway as, say, the State of New York has,
when it comes to defending Puerto Rican national culture. In other
words, it may provide extra support for its Puerto Rican community
only insofar as necessary to make up for prior injustices or to advance
a compelling state interest. It must otherwise remain impartial.
A governmental policy of partiality toward a particular cultural
perspective violates pluralist principles not simply because it does not
benefit all disadvantaged groups on equal terms. It also fails to allow
sufficient distance between government and the main ethnic
community. The pluralist state may not fully embrace any of its
subgroups.137 It may not take over their perspective or make their
interests its own. The local government engages in precisely this kind
of identification with Puerto Rican national culture. It takes charge
of defining the cultural agenda. This kind of official assertion
transcends pluralism, in which private individuals or groups
ultimately bear the responsibility of promoting national cultures.
Local authorities might try to justify a Puerto Rican cultural
exception on the grounds that Puerto Rico is the only major

136. See, e.g., 18 L.P.R.A. § 1195 ("The Institute of Puerto Rican Culture is hereby
reorganized as an official, corporate and autonomous entity whose purpose is to preserve,
promote, enrich and diffuse the cultural values of the Puerto Rican people, and achieve a
broader and fuller awareness thereof.").
137. See 18 L.P.R.A. § 1198 (Broadly and meticulously empowering the "Institute of Puerto
Rican Culture" to carry out the cultural "public policy.").
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territorial unit in the United States inhabited almost exclusively by
138
citizens with a distinct national culture. This fact does not, however,
entitle the insular government to side with its Puerto Rican
constituency. Those advocating a pluralist standpoint would actually
go out of their way to ban partiality towards the Puerto Rican
majority under these circumstances. Any such bias would constitute
an injustice against overwhelmingly outnumbered minorities, such as
Anglos and other ethnic subgroups residing on the island. Pluralists
would agree with liberals that the interests of the majority may not
displace the rights of minorities.
The free and associated state, or a future fully integrated state of
Puerto Rico, obviously cannot simply disregard the wishes of 90% of
the people it represents. It must, nonetheless, ignore all requests that
that constituency makes as a national or ethnic unit against the will of
all others. Otherwise, it would be in breach of the pluralist political
culture. It may, therefore, attend to the needs of the Puerto Rican
majority only on matters that do not involve the establishment of a
national culture. In fact, pluralists would predict that Puerto Ricans
would not vote as a block on these non-cultural issues. From this
perspective, Puerto Ricans would break down in the same way as the
rest of the citizenry does.139
Of course, the pluralist state would allow and even subsidize
efforts by Puerto Ricans to live and reproduce their national culture.
It would thus officially acknowledge and encourage them on a par
with other national groups, such as Italian-Americans or IrishAmericans. Yet, in the words of former Governor Rafael Hernández
Colón, many Puerto Ricans seem to want not simply the status of
“another minority group in a pluralist society,” but rather that of a
“nationality, a different people.”140 They appear to have an interest
138. Juan Manuel Carrión avers that "the fundamental problem that the statehood
movement has always faced is the repudiation by many Americans of the idea of admitting as a
federal state a culturally different entity such as Puerto Rico." CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at 168.
139. Walzer believes that majorities in pluralist societies, such as the United States, are
contingent and ever shifting. "American majorities," he declares, "are temporary in character
and differently constituted for different purposes and occasions. . . " WALZER, supra note 122,
at 30; see also CARLOS NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 126–27
(1996) ("In a working democracy, it is essential that the majority never be a definite group of
the population but only a construction which refers to individuals who change constantly
according to the issue at stake.").
140. Salomé Galib Bras, Ante el Congreso la batalla por la nacionalidad puertorriqueña, EL
NUEVO DÍA (San Juan), Jan. 31, 1993 (quoting statement by former governor Rafael Hernández
Colón at the 1991 congressional hearings on the Puerto Rico Plebiscite Bill). Hernández Colón
does not fully realize, however, that this claim is as difficult to accommodate within the current
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not merely in public notice and general subventions, but rather in an
intense identification with their national culture on the part of the
current free associated state or a future federal state of Puerto Rico.
This aim runs counter to pluralism.
Pluralist political principles would not allow for an “Institute of
Puerto Rican Culture,” strictly speaking. They would at most
authorize an “Institute of Culture,” which would simply promote
cultural expression on the island irrespective of ethnic or national
identification. Such a body would have no categorical right to
exclude Anglo cultural projects, just as the state of Montana may not
refuse funding for Greek-American or African-American events.
The contention that the excluded groups traditionally have no
significant presence in the territory, and are therefore not really part
of the collective ethnic identity, would be irrelevant. The local
governments in Puerto Rico and Montana, respectively, would have
no business delineating and watching over anything like a purely
“Puerto Rican” or “Montanan” state culture.
The pluralist political culture would also condemn Puerto Rico’s
language policies. The free and associated state, or a future state of
Puerto Rico, would have to renounce its efforts to keep Spanish as
the vernacular. It would not be able to take measures to encourage
the use of Spanish in everyday life. For it would thus show too much
bias in favor of and identification with the Puerto Rican majority. It
would be entitled to conduct its business (including public school
teaching) in Spanish on grounds of expedience or of compensation for
historical or structural disadvantages, but not as part of an attempt to
protect or embrace the national culture. Incidentally, U.S. pluralism
would likely impose similar restrictions on the current states of the
Union—even if the Spanish-speaking community attained majority
status in any one of them.
To sum up, U.S. pluralism proscribes state support of Puerto
Rican national culture beyond the aid afforded other groups or
beyond the amount that compensation for past discrimination would
require. It forbids the insular government to present itself as
principally representing Puerto Ricans. It calls on local authorities to
avoid siding with the overwhelming majority. Puerto Rico is in
violation of principles of U.S. political culture, inasmuch as the
free associated state as within a future state of Puerto Rico. See also CARRIÓN, supra note 4, at
180 (Americans "do not want us the way we are and the resistance against the attempt to
dissolve us as a people with national aspirations to convert us into another one of the ethnic
minorities in the North American imperial conglomerate continues to be very strong.").
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insular government preferentially subsidizes and intensely identifies
with Puerto Rican national culture. As long as the island remains
part of the United States, the local authorities should honor the
prevailing political principles. By upholding its cultural policy, Puerto
Rico actually forsakes the U.S. polity.
V. THE LEGITIMACY OF PUERTO RICO’S
NATIONAL CULTURE POLICY
I have argued that a policy of official partiality towards, and
identification with, Puerto Rican national culture collides with U.S.
pluralism. Insofar as the insular government adopts such a course of
action, Puerto Rico remains outside U.S. political culture and adheres
to its own political principles. In this section, I will explore the extent
to which these norms are philosophically sound.
Why should authorities, in Puerto Rico or anywhere else, do
more than merely allow a particular ethnic community to develop its
national culture on its own, or at most offer it some subvention?
Does the proposed official cultural program not amount to treating
that group as an endangered species? If the members are not willing
or able to preserve their national culture by their own devices or even
with some state aid, why should the government feel an obligation to
step in? Would such a policy not be patronizing and ultimately
doomed to fail, inasmuch as the beneficiaries themselves do not have
141
the motivation or the means to sustain their own national culture?
To begin answering these queries, one has to understand the
specific predicament that a threatened national culture may face.
Granted, if the members of the national subgroup have themselves no
real interest in their own culture, it is illegitimate and hopeless for the
142
Nevertheless, the situation
government to try to take their place.
might be dramatically different. For instance, the people may
perceive their national culture as a public good whose survival is a
matter of fundamental concern for them and, yet, face a collective
action problem. In other words, even though they will jointly
influence the flourishing of the national culture, they may make
individual choices that prevent them from fully realizing their
common aim. They may not be able to coordinate their actions and
may, as a consequence, end up bringing about an outcome that they
recognize as suboptimal or even disastrous.
141. See HABERMAS, supra note 108.
142. Id.
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A national community may thus confront a prisoner’s dilemma
143
When the members simply act on their
or a free rider problem.
immediate preferences, they may unknowingly or unwillingly
undermine their shared culture. Their discrete decisions may have
the effect of an “invisible hand” that, unlike that celebrated by Adam
Smith,144 brings about collective doom. Consequently, they may have
to band together as a polity and undertake extreme measures to
protect their national culture. As pointed out in section III, Puerto
Ricans have only supported political parties that favor strong state
intervention to prop up their culture.
They appear to feel that they cannot provide enough protection
on their own through private donations and personal engagement.
They seem to want their government to embody their collective will
to foment the national culture. A cultural policy that thus elicited not
indifference or reluctance, but rather approval and cooperation from
the people, would have legitimacy and real prospects for success.
The popular endorsement of the Institute of Puerto Rican
Culture and the Puerto Rican Atheneum provides a case in point.
People apparently sense that because of diseconomies of scale or
unfair competition, the insular culture is at a comparative
disadvantage in relation to imported alternatives. Of course,
individuals could support local cinema, literature, music, dance, and
art simply by paying a hefty price. Yet, many may be willing to do so
only if they have some kind of reassurance that the rest of the
citizenry will chip in, too, and therefore that their sacrifice will make a
difference. They may fear that without widespread support, the
national culture will ineluctably deteriorate. Others may feel tempted
to free ride or may experience akrasia—that is, weakness of will—at
the moment of truth. Puerto Ricans who fall into any of these
categories may all come together and demand that their government
help them realize collectively what they cannot achieve individually.
They may specifically urge the authorities to tax them in order to
subsidize the national cultural industry.
When they call on their government to embrace their national
culture, people may not only be attempting an act of collective
defense. They may also be demanding that state institutions identify
143. In the classic prisoner's dilemma, it is individually rational but collectively irrational for
two isolated codefendants to confess. R. DUNCAN LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND
DECISIONS 95 (1957).
144. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 423 (1937).
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intensely with their national culture. They may be striving for a
public life that expresses their identity. They may be seeking a
political and legal order that they can call their own, that principally
reflects their perspective, and that speaks their language.
Puerto Ricans seem to be making a claim of this sort when they
insist that insular bureaucracies operate in Spanish and embody the
national character. Of course, expediency and consistency support
this demand too. For instance, government business must take place
in Spanish in part because an overwhelming majority of the
population possesses fluency in no other language. Similarly, the
local Supreme Court has resolved to rescue and purge the Puerto
Rican civil law tradition,145 to some extent, because a legal system that
randomly mixes common law and civil law elements functions
irrationally and unpredictably. Nonetheless, most justifications for
projecting the national culture into political and legal institutions
146
invoke the danger of “transculturation,” rather than that of
incoherence. The underlying idea is that the institutionalization at
stake represents a valuable means to protect a menaced national
culture. This kind of argument would survive even against irrefutable
proof that Puerto Rican politics and law would mesh more sensibly
with the U.S. superstructure if they shed their nationalist nostalgia.
In thus institutionalizing the national culture, as opposed to
merely subsidizing it, the authorities take on a task that simply lies
beyond the reach of private citizens. Ordinary people, even if they
organized themselves perfectly, would not be able to bring the
political and legal apparatus to incarnate the national identity. State
action ineluctably has to play a crucial role.
Hence, an official subvention or institutionalization of the
national culture need not constitute an elitist or pointless gesture
against the will or indifference of the people. It may instead
empower Puerto Ricans to realize goals that they cherish, but cannot
carry out individually. Obviously, the fact that Puerto Ricans need
and want state assistance in order to effectively promote their cultural
heritage does not in itself sufficiently justify the insular government’s

145. See, e.g., Valle v. Amer. Inter. Ins. Co., 108 P.R. Dec. 692 (1979) (Spanish), 8 P.R.
Offic. Trans. 735 (English) ("Nowadays, it seems unnecessary to reiterate that, in Puerto Rico,
the law in the field of damages is governed—both in form and in content—by the civil law
system. . . . Consequently, all cases cited which tend to solve civil law problems through
common-law principles are reversed.").
146. See, e.g., JOSÉ TRÍAS MONGE, SOCIEDAD, DERECHO Y JUSTICIA 28 (1986); see also id.
at 21, 33, 107–08.
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effort. As already noted, liberals and even pluralists would repudiate
the official measures as unfair to those who are not part of, or want
no part, in the national culture. They would chastise the policy at
issue for violating the all-important principle of impartiality.
Charles Taylor attempts to provide a response to this charge,
when he endorses Quebec’s ardent defense of its national culture. He
maintains that such a policy is legitimate so long as it does not violate
fundamental rights.147 For instance, the authorities may privilege the
main national group when they regulate commercial speech or public
school instruction on history. Yet, they may not do the same when
intervening in the area of voting rights or freedom of religion.
Drawing a line between rights that are fundamental and those
that are not is not only difficult, but also at times arbitrary. Further, if
the basic charter of rights includes anything like an equality or antidiscrimination principle, then the disparate treatment that Taylor
condones would not pass muster under a liberal interpretation of the
148
norm. Therefore, one should give up the quest for a universal set of
basic principles and instead formulate a defense of the national
cultural policies at issue from a perspective that transcends both
liberalism and pluralism.
Rather than defining some areas in which society may
discriminate and others in which it may not, one should start by
declaring all official partiality suspect. Such an approach, which
reflects a strong concern regarding possible discrimination against

147. "A society with strong collective goals can be liberal," Taylor notes, "provided it is also
capable of respecting diversity, especially when this concerns those who do not share its goals,
and provided it can offer adequate safeguards for fundamental rights." TAYLOR, supra note
126, at 177. Taylor would "call for the invariant defense of certain rights, of course. There
would be no question of cultural differences determining the application of habeas corpus, for
example." Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM AND 'THE
POLITICS OF RECOGNITION' 61 (Amy Gutman ed., 1992). Generally, "the rights in question are
conceived to be the fundamental and crucial ones that have been recognized as such from the
very beginning of the liberal tradition: rights to life, liberty, due process, free speech, free
practice of religion, and so on." Id. at 59; see also TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 176. Yet, his
conception distinguishes "these fundamental rights from the broad range of immunities and
presumptions of uniform treatment that have sprung up in modern cultures of judicial review"
and is "willing to weight the importance of certain forms of uniform treatment against the
importance of cultural survival, and opt sometimes in favor of the latter." Taylor, The Politics
of Recongnition, supra, at 61; see also TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 176. Similarly, Joseph Raz
and Avishai Margalit maintain that the right to self-determination is conditional on the national
group respecting "the basic rights of its inhabitants, so that [the group's] establishment will do
good rather than add to the ills of this world." Joseph Raz & Avishai Margalit, National SelfDetermination, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 125, 143–44 (Joseph Raz ed., 1994).
148. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 119; DWORKIN, supra note 120.
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minorities and dissidents, underlay my discussion of the nationalist
model in the U.S. context. I noted that a policy of partiality towards a
particular national culture should rest on solid reasons. I suggested,
specifically, that the authorities must demonstrate that the national
culture faces a danger calling for an official response, that they have
narrowly tailored their measures to the existing threat, and that they
have sufficiently preserved citizens’ cultural autonomy.
Consequently, an official identification with the majority culture
will not be justified in all cases. Only polities that meet the
established conditions may take sides in cultural politics. Other
societies will not have this prerogative. An official bias will be
particularly unacceptable if the dominant culture carries with it a
history of oppressiveness towards others.
The Puerto Rican political community may assert, certainly more
credibly than its U.S. counterpart, that a menace exists and requires a
collective response. In addition to having suffered brutal oppression
by the forces of occupation during the first half of the twentieth
century,149 Puerto Rican culture today must struggle for survival
within U.S. borders, despite its minority status, and faces awesome
economic and social disadvantages.150
Consequently, the local
government may perform a reassurance and coercion role, through
subsidies or taxes, in order to keep its citizens on board and in line.
By the same token, Puerto Ricans may call upon their representatives
to establish an official national language or maintain the national
character of political and legal institutions.
Of course, the
government would always have to show that its cultural measures are
not overbroad. Thus, while it could reasonably require that judicial
proceedings take place in Spanish, a ban on court translators for
Anglos would certainly exceed the needs of cultural protection.
As a final requirement, the insular government would have to
create sufficient breathing room for the cultural self-determination of

149. "If the reaction was often violent, so was the process of cultural assimilation subsumed
in the concept of 'Americanization.' Rejected as full members of the American political
community, consigned as political orphans to the limbo of an unincorporated territory, from
1898 to the late 1920s the Puerto Ricans were the objects of a campaign of cultural
assimilation—above all evident in the enforcement of the use of English in the educational
system—on a scale practiced by few other imperial powers." CARR, supra note 8, at 279–80.
150. U.S. mass culture has an overwhelming and threatening presence throughout the world
and certainly more so in the territory of Puerto Rico. "Since the 1940s, Americanization has no
longer been imposed from above; [it] is an attitude that seeps up from below. Its instruments
are the American supermarket and television; its missionaries, the emigrants returning from the
mainland." Id. at 288.
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minorities and dissenters. It would have to guarantee that those who
have no interest in joining the national crusade may pursue their own
cultural options. It must uphold not only these persons’ right to
cultural autonomy, but also their human dignity in a Kantian sense.151
In other words, it would have to recognize their cultural identity, as
well as steer clear of protecting the national culture. To be sure, the
government may impose burdens on them in its pursuit of that goal.
Yet, it may not completely disregard their status as persons worthy of
respect.
If the Puerto Rican government proscribed Anglo cultural events
or private schools in English, it would trample upon the autonomy
rights of the U.S. native minority. Of course, such measures would
most likely also be excessive. Yet, even if they were necessary for the
protection of the national culture, they would not pass muster
because of their repressive effect on cultural self-determination of
ethnic subgroups.
In a sense, the insular effort in this realm is nothing but an
extension of the compensatory subvention of disadvantaged
communities under pluralism, however, the favored group in the
situation under consideration is not a minority, but rather an
overwhelming majority.
More significantly, the Puerto Rican
government does not look after other underprivileged subgroups in
relatively equal terms. It instead focuses on Puerto Ricans and makes
their needs and aspirations its own. It serves as a vehicle of Puerto
Rican collective self-realization and thus transcends the pluralist
political culture.
Even if primarily committed to the national culture, the Puerto
Rican government certainly has a duty to take into account the
interest of all ethnic groups, particularly those that are disadvantaged.
The pluralist arguments for redressing past discrimination and for
encouraging diversity apply with special urgency to a society with a
national cultural agenda. The Puerto Rican government must
therefore reach out to traditionally disadvantaged groups, such as
Dominicans, as well as make it possible for other communities, such
as Spanish, Cuban, or Anglo subgroups, to thrive culturally.
Such an official defense of the Puerto Rican national culture
would ultimately not simply be nationalist, but also progressive. First,
it would seek to place the national culture in a position of equality

151. IMMANUEL KANT, GRUNDLEGUNG ZUR METAPHYSIK DER SITTEN, Werke, Bd. IV
(1975).
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(rather than hegemony) vis-à-vis other cultures. It would, in this
sense, have a reparatory rather than an authoritarian aim. Second, it
would interpret the national culture inclusively instead of exclusively.
It would thus enthusiastically incorporate the contributions of other
national subgroups. Finally, it would value the cultural autonomy of
individuals and divergent groups in the way I have just described.
VI. COMING OUT OF THE CLOSET: BILATERAL
ASSOCIATION AND ASYMMETRICAL FEDERALISM
The U.S. laws and constitutional provisions that enact the
pluralist principles in question bind Puerto Rico as a commonwealth,
as much as they would if it were to become a state. Therefore, it is
already in violation for its partial cultural policy. As I have already
speculated, the ambiguous relationship between mainland and island
probably explains the lack of full enforcement thus far. Nonetheless,
the U.S. political community presently exerts some pressure and
would certainly intensify its coercive mechanisms if Puerto Rico
joined the Union. The United States would have powerful political
and legal arguments on its side. Puerto Rico’s cultural policy is
illegitimate, as well as at risk, under the existing status and would be
more so under ordinary statehood.
By embracing an official national culture, Puerto Rico effectively
opts out of the U.S. political community and into a polity of its own.
It rejects U.S. pluralism and endorses nationalism, hopefully of a
progressive nature. This choice does not automatically preclude
Puerto Rico from staying legitimately within the United States. Yet,
the relationship between the two peoples would have to take a special
form in order to accommodate two substantially different political
communities. It would have to come to allow the two divergent sets
of political principles or political cultures, each reasonably defensible
within its own context, to coexist side by side.
The United States would be in a position to fully recognize
Puerto Rican cultural distinctness by becoming a multinational state.
According to Michael Walzer, this kind of solution offers the only
hope of democratic and egalitarian survival for “composite states”
with “groups of people who share some but not all of the
characteristics of a distinct historical community and who retain a
152
strong territorial base.” Walzer’s formula seems to bear upon the
152. WALZER, supra note 129, at 56 ("Thus autonomy may be an alternative to
independence, loosening the bonds of the composite state a way to avoid their fracture. Instead

FINAL OQUENDO.DOC

2004]

3/8/2005 9:44 AM

PUERTO RICO’S QUEST FOR DIFFERENCE

293

case at hand. Puerto Rico constitutes a community not only with a
history and territory separate from those of the United States, but
also with its own peculiar political culture.
Construed
multinationally, the United States would permit Puerto Rico to
remain a commonwealth or even become a state without giving up
the intense official bias in favor of the insular national culture.
Puerto Ricans would be in a position to achieve recognition,
domestically as well as internationally.
One path to this destination would consist in interpreting the
United States as a union of nations, with each state representing a
separate polity and having the opportunity to decide on its own
matters of political principle, however, the United States has clearly
rejected this model, although it once might have constituted a real
153
The various states did not maintain separate ethnic
option.
identities, in part due to the intense internal mobility characteristic of
154
the United States. Nor did they evolve into independent political
cultures, mostly because the federal Constitution commits them to a
robust set of common principles.155 The Union thus constitutes a
single political community.
The United States therefore does not amount to a confederation
of discrete nations or polities, and would not realistically fit a
reinterpretation as such. Puerto Rico may not legitimately remain
part of the United States as a regular state or commonwealth and
preserve its separate and conflicting political culture. It must instead
forge a special binational relationship with the Union. The island
of sovereignty, national and ethnic groups may opt for decentralization, devolution, and
federalism; these are not incompatible with self-determination, and they may be especially
appropriate for groups of people who share some but not all of the characteristics of a distinct
historical community and who retain a strong territorial base. Whether composite states can
survive as federations is by no means certain, but it is unlikely that they can survive in any other
way—not at least, if they remain committed (even if only formally) to democratic government
or to some sort of social egalitarianism.").
153. José Luis González comments that some statehood supporters mistakenly believe that
the United States is a republic of republics. GONZÁLEZ, supra note 84, at 24. The U.S.
Constitution not only creates a federal government with supreme authority in its areas of
competence over the states, but also imposes a thick set of political principles on them, most
conspicuously through the Fourteenth Amendment. As already noted, the U.S. Supreme Court
has extended almost the entire Bill of Rights to the states. See supra note 116.
154. To be sure, Walzer conceives of the United States as a "union of nationalities."
WALZER, supra note 129, at 9. Yet, those nationalities are rather informal groups, which live
dispersed throughout the country and do not constitute corporate political units. In other
words, they do not have any kind of official self-government. Therefore, Walzer does not mean
the states of the Union.
155. See supra note 116.
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would converge with the fifty states, not on their common political
principles, but rather on some shared ideals of political and economic
solidarity. In particular, Puerto Rico would be exempt from the
political culture promulgated by the U.S. Constitution and statutory
code.
This kind of settlement is conceivable regardless of whether the
island remains a commonwealth or becomes a state.
As a
commonwealth, Puerto Rico would have to move the federal
Congress to declare key legal and constitutional provisions
inapplicable in the Puerto Rican context and to empower the island
to go its own way. As a state, Puerto Rico would have to negotiate an
alteration of the U.S. federation so as to gain a similar kind of
immunity for itself.
I will examine each these two options
independently.
Under the first scenario, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
would not only acquire space to survive as a separate political
community, it could additionally overcome the current democratic
deficit, to which I alluded earlier, and truly attain the status of a free
and associated state. Accordingly, Congress would no longer
unilaterally define the relationship between mainland and island.
Instead, both communities would enter a truly bilateral pact, alterable
only by mutual consent. This agreement, which would underlie the
federal enactment on Puerto Rico, would specify the areas and terms
of convergence, as well as divergence. Most relevantly, it would
empower the insular government to engage itself on behalf of the
national culture along the lines previously described. Of course, in
order to function as a true democracy, Puerto Rico would have to
acquire a right of revision over locally applicable congressional laws.
Under the second alternative, a State of Puerto Rico would
define itself as a distinct polity. It would have a different bond to the
Union than that of the other states. The U.S. Constitution would
have to change to acknowledge the island’s uniqueness. Some parts
of the document would not apply to Puerto Rico, or would call for a
special interpretation in the insular context. The United States would
not be able to interfere with Puerto Rico’s national cultural policy.
Puerto Rico would finally become a genuine jíbaro state.
Both of these formulas would render express and secure the
implicit terms of the present relationship. Accordingly, the insular
government would have explicit authority to continue (and even
intensify) its current cultural policies. It would be able to maintain
Spanish as the official language. It would have the right to preserve
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the Puerto Rican Culture Institute, as well as the state funding of the
Puerto Rican Atheneum. It would be entitled to retain its tax
incentives for Puerto Rican arts. It would be in a position rightfully
to keep the island’s international profile in matters of culture and
sports.
The bilateral association enactment and the constitutional
amendment, respectively, could actually go further than the present
practice in recognizing Puerto Rico’s status as a separate political
community. They could require the federal authorities to fully
respect Puerto Rico’s own constitutional principles, including those
156
They
that prohibit the death penalty and electronic surveillance.
could empower Puerto Rico to regulate commercial speech for the
benefit of the Puerto Rican language and culture, while escaping the
strictures read into the First Amendment by the U.S. Supreme Court.
They could declare the Sixth Amendment right to a criminal jury
inapplicable to the island so as to allow Puerto Rico to fully develop
its civil law personality. They could grant Puerto Rican government
immunity from suits under the Fourteenth Amendment or the
Privileges and Immunities Clause by Anglophone U.S. citizens
demanding the provision of all services in English, or challenging the
insular state’s systematic bias in favor of the Puerto Rican national
perspective. Finally, they could limit the U.S. federal government’s
monopoly on foreign policy,157 in order to make it possible for Puerto
Rico to enter into international agreements not only to assert the
island’s political personality internationally, but also to reconnect
with Latin America.
In the end, the two options under consideration would afford
Puerto Rico the same exclusive jurisdiction over insular cultural
policy, in a broad sense. In principle, the two arrangements could
overlap entirely in their allocation of powers between the federal and
the local government. The main difference would be in the
mechanisms through which the Union would exercise its authority.

156. See P.R. CONST. Art. II, § 7 ("The death penalty shall not exist."); P.R. CONST. Art. II,
§ 10 ("Wire-tapping is prohibited. . . . Evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
inadmissible in the courts."). Under the current commonwealth status, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit has held that federal statutes imposing the death penalty and
allowing wiretapping apply in Puerto Rico, local constitutional prohibitions notwithstanding.
United States v. Acosta Martínez, 252 F.3d 13, 17–21 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. Quiñones
758 F.2d 40, 41–43 (1st Cir. 1985). Of course, federal enactments would prevail over the local
constitution all the more clearly if Puerto Rico became an ordinary state.
157. See U.S. CONST. art. I ("No state shall, without the consent of Congress, . . . enter into
any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power, or engage in war . . . . ").
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As an enhanced commonwealth, Puerto Rico would have to consent
to the laws and orders emanating from the federation. A binational
body could adjudicate disputes on the terms of the relationship.
Under the statehood alternative, the U.S. Congress, with equal
Puerto Rican representation, and the U.S. President, in whose
election Puerto Ricans would participate, would legislate and directly
execute in all delegated, noncultural matters. The Federal Supreme
Court could settle controversies regarding the distribution of powers.
Coincidentally, Charles Taylor also contemplates an
asymmetrically federal setup when he proposes accommodating
158
Quebec within a Canadian “bi–national state.” Like the postulated
State of Puerto Rico, Quebec would have a special relationship to the
rest of the country, different from that of all other provinces and
allowing intense local measures on behalf of Quebecois national
culture.159 Uniting the entire society would be a commitment to a
general set of human rights as well as to economic coordination and
solidarity. Puerto Rico and the United States might converge along
similar lines. Analogous to Taylor’s Canada, the United States would
exist as a Union of fifty states at one level, and as confederation of
two states, with radically different political cultures, at another level.
Of course, Puerto Rico would run into enormous obstacles in
trying to attain either bilateral association with, or asymmetrical
federalism within, the United States. As already noted, the U.S.
Congress has persistently dragged its feet when confronted with the
Puerto Rican question. Federal lawmakers have a keen aversion to
Puerto Rican statehood, due to the expenses and power sharing
involved. An asymmetrical arrangement for a future state of Puerto
Rico would run into even more adamant opposition because it would
reek of special treatment and create a dangerous precedent. In fact, it
would ultimately infringe upon the very idea of a federation of equals.
If Quebec has not been able to achieve true binationalism, Puerto
Rico—with infinitely less political clout within the United States than
Quebec within Canada—faces terrible odds at becoming an
idiosyncratic state in the sense just outlined.
The bilateral associative alternative would also be hard to sell,
though certainly less so. Proponents would still have to move U.S.
legislators out of their calculated inertia. They would face resistance
similar to that confronted by an asymmetrical statehood lobby

158. TAYLOR, supra note 126, at 102.
159. Id. at 52–57.
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because they, too, would seem to be looking for a sweet deal and
setting a bad example. Other territories, or perhaps even some states,
might be tempted to ask for the same kind of treatment. From the
lawmakers’ perspective, the only significant advantage that a freely
associated Puerto Rico would have over a jíbaro state would be that it
would not impinge upon the notion of a federation of equals.
More generally, if two nations are so divided in terms of their
political culture (let alone their social culture), there appears to be
little point in attempting to forge a single country out of them. They
could honor their broad convergence in matters of human rights and
economic policy through international agreements. They would thus
not have to surmount the immense obstacles involved in setting up
the binational arrangements just discussed.
Genuine political integration requires convergence on a thick
160
political culture. What distinguishes an international alliance from
a nation state is precisely that the former embraces a relatively
abstract assortment of political principles, whereas the latter endorses
a very specific set. Therefore, domestic political cohesion is rather
complete, while its global counterpart is only partial. Of course, no
clear-cut criteria exist to establish when an entity has sufficiently
coalesced in matters of politics to constitute a nation state. Yet, when
two communities diverge in their basic political norms, they are
evidently not in a position to form a coherent polity. The United
States and Puerto Rico provide a case in point.
Consequently, neither a bilateral association nor an asymmetric
federation would truly integrate Puerto Rico and the United States
politically. Island and mainland would remain separate polities. To
some extent, they would be deluding themselves by pretending to
constitute a single political unit.

160. On this analysis, the European Union may ride on a thin political convergence only so
long as it remains an association of sovereign states. Under such circumstances, it will suffice to
have broad democratic guidelines and a general convention of human rights. In order to
become a nation state, the Union would have to achieve full political integration around a welldeveloped political consciousness. Habermas, accordingly, refers to the need for "a Europewide political culture" and explains that "[a] European constitutional patriotism must . . .
coalesce out of the various nationally and historically impregnated interpretations of the same
universal principles of law." HABERMAS, FAKTIZITÄT, supra note 108, at 561. Europe would
thus have to come together politically to the extent Switzerland has. "The case of Switzerland,"
Habermas avers, "demonstrates that such a common political and cultural self-understanding
can stem from the cultural orientation of different nationalities." Id. Needless to say, if it ever
reaches this stage, the European Union will have to face up to the specter of internal nationalist
independence movements striving for secession in order to enact a different political culture.
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However, a genuine commitment to the national culture would
require the two Puerto Rican parties that favor keeping the island
within the United States to push for a binational solution along the
lines suggested.
Needless to say, neither of these political
organizations has explicitly adopted this kind of approach. Both have
embraced the end of promoting Puerto Rican culture without making
concrete proposals on how to overcome that goal’s tension with U.S.
political principles. They have thus demonstrated not only their
failure fully to reflect upon their ideals, but also their reluctance to
talk straight with their constituency, and especially with the U.S.
leadership, about their seemingly unrealistic ambitions.
A separatist movement bent on tight contact points with the
United States would run into difficulties of its own. It, too, would
have to shake up an entrenched status quo. By the same token, it
would have to convince U.S. authorities that it is neither unfairly
asking for preferential treatment, nor setting a dangerous precedent.
Of course, it would confront fewer hurdles on this front than the
group vying for free association, let alone that striving for asymmetric
federalism. Moreover, it would not head into its counterparts’
coherence problem, inasmuch as it would not be trying to keep two
distinct polities within the same political boundaries. As its main
challenge, however, it would have to convince a reluctant Puerto
Rican citizenry of the advantages of independence.
VII. CONFIGURING CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE
Puerto Rico’s deep official commitment to the national culture
clashes with federal political principles. It encroaches specifically
upon the requirement that the state remain neutral with respect to
different ethnic groups. This conflict takes place not only under a
nationalistic or liberal interpretation of the U.S. political culture, but
even under a pluralist construction. Viewed as a community devoted
to a most appealing pluralism, the United States welcomes differences
on its territory. Yet, it cannot allow particular subgroups to use the
state apparatus to promote their national culture. Therefore, Puerto
Rico would have to give up its thoroughly partial cultural engagement
in order have a legitimate place within the U.S. Constitution.
Of course, Puerto Ricans overwhelmingly expect their
government to continue embracing the national culture. They have
no intention of giving this demand up. In fact, their three main
political parties have relentlessly promised to stand by them on this
issue. Moreover, the policy at stake is justified insofar as Puerto
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Rican culture faces a genuine threat calling for a collective response,
the authorities narrowly tailor their measures to overcome the danger
in question, and dissident as well as minority groups have space to
exercise their cultural autonomy.
In order to overcome the inconsistency between U.S. pluralism
and the Puerto Rican cultural agenda, the relations between mainland
and island must change radically. Puerto Rico must gain exemption
from U.S. political principles, as well as the right to constitute a
separate polity. It must thus enter either bilateral association or an
asymmetric federation with the United States.
To be sure, both alternatives would run into immense obstacles,
such as strong opposition from the U.S. establishment. They would
seem to grant special privileges to Puerto Ricans and to establish a
dangerous precedent, which other states might feel tempted to follow.
Furthermore, the peoples of the United States and Puerto Rico could
more sensibly establish a similar relationship as sovereign nations
with substantial international ties. Needless to say, it is for these two
communities to make the final decision, democratically and without
coercion, as to how closely they want to intertwine their destinies.
To close the deliberative circle, I end this conclusion on the same
note as the introduction. Puerto Ricans almost unanimously share
the conviction that the national culture is not negotiable. Moreover,
they broadly agree that the island should maintain some kind of
interdependence with the United States on matters of economics,
immigration, defense, and citizenship. Opinions diverge only on how
exactly to set up these interconnections. In this sense, the political
disagreement in Puerto Rico is about details. The debate typically
heats up because partisan politicking distorts the stakes and presents
the three status alternatives as fundamentally at odds with each other.
The discussion would unfold more constructively if it did not first
focus on the three competing formulas, but rather on the right mix of
competence sharing with the United States. Once the peoples of
Puerto Rico and the United States reach a consensus on this issue,
they will agonize less over whether they want to interrelate as
asymmetrical federates, as free associates, or as sovereign nations.
They would perceive the question as pertaining to form rather than
content. Only then would the U.S. apprehensions and the Puerto
Rican divisiveness regarding this issue wane, at least to some extent.

